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FEDERAL OIL PRICE CONTROLS IN
BANKRUPTCY CASES: GOVERNMENT CLAIMS
FOR REPAYMENT OF ILLEGAL
OVERCHARGES SHOULD NOT BE
SUBORDINATED AS "PENALTIES"
UNDER 11 USC § 726(a)(4)
THOMAS A. SCI-wEITZER*
White collar crime and the violation of government economic regulations
have flourished in the United States in recent years.' For example, wide-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College; A.B., Holy
Cross College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Yale Law School.
Part of the research for this article was financed with a grant from the Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center of Touro College. The author appreciates this assistance and also the helpful comments
of colleagues who read earlier drafts.
1. The most enormous and costly fraud probably occurred in the savings and loan industry.
According to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, "Wrongdoing in the savings and loan industry
may turn out to be the biggest white-collar swindle in the history of our nation." Against Savings
and Loan Fraud, 53 BANmKo REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 932 (Dec. 18, 1989). A major portion of
the federally-insured losses by depositors for which the taxpayers will end up paying is universally
attributed to fraud and illegality on the part of the institutions' officers. See, e.g., Savings
Industry's Costly Fraud, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at Dl, col. 3; Savings Fraud Losses Seen as
Lost for Good, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at Dl, col. 4; Savings Unit Fines Imposed, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1988, at D26, col. 2. The savings and loan debacle bears interesting resemblances
to the oil price regulation violations: (1) both problems were centered in Texas; (2) in both
instances, the regulatory enforcement apparatus at least initially proved inadequate to the task of
policing and combatting the fraud, perhaps because Congress failed to anticipate the level of fraud
which would occur; and (3) in both instances the victims of the frauds were consumers and
taxpayers.
In view of the fact that the federal government will have to supply many billions of dollars to
make good on the applicable Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Association guarantees, it is
also foreseeable that the government will seek restitution from those responsible for those losses
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spread violations of the Mandatory Petroleum Price and Allocation
Regulations 2 occurred during the Carter Administration.3 The United States
Department of Energy (the "DOE"), 4 which had been entrusted with the
job of enforcing the price regulations,5 responded by attempting to force
the violators, many of whom were oil resellers, 6 to disgorge their illegal
gains.7 By the time DOE auditors and attorneys caught up with the
violators in the early 1980s,8 however, many of them had become insol-
which resulted from fraud. If that happens and savings and loan institutions go into bankruptcy,
such cases might well pose the same legal issue under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1978), which this
article addresses.
2. 10 C.F.R. §§ 205, 210, 212 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 27.45, The petroleum
allocation regulations are irrelevant to the subject of this article. The relevant cases address only
violations of the price regulations.
3. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce calculated that, during 1979 and the first six months of 1980 alone, false
classification of petroleum by unscrupulous resellers cost American consumers about $2.2 billion.
SrF oF SURCOMM. ON OvimoIMr AN INVasOATIONS OF THE HoUsE CoMI. ON INTERSTATE AND
FosN CoMmacE, 96T CoNO., 2D Sass., REPORT: Tim CASE or THE BILUON Dou.AR STmIP
18 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SuBcomm=r RE'ORT].
President Reagan abolished the price regulations on January 28, 1981, one week after taking
office. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9,909 (1981). The DOE's effort to enforce the
regulations ironically reached a climax during the Reagan Administration-after their abolition.
While the DOE's enforcement effort continues, Congress in 1986 enacted the Petroleum Overcharge
Distribution and Restitution Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 450-4507, which set a general deadline of Sept.
30, 1988, for bringing all DOE civil enforcement actions based on violation of the price
regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 4504(a)(1) (1974). Congress also provided a "savings clause" for all
cases commenced before that date. 15 U.S.C. § 767 (1974). See also I U.S.C. § 109 (1947).
4. The DOE was created in August 1977 by the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375. It replaced the Federal Energy Administration and various other related
agencies.
5. The Department of Energy Organization Act transferred authority to enforce the Mandatory
Petroleum Price and Allocation Regulations to the DOE.
6. One of the easiest and most lucrative ways to violate the Mandatory Petroleum Price and
Allocation Regulations was to raise prices illegally when reselling oil. Accordingly, many if not
most of the fraudulent violations of the regulations were committed by resellers.
7. Section 209 of the Economic Stabilization Act (the "ESA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969),
adopted by § 5(a) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (the "EPAA") 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)
(1975), authorized the government to enforce the price regulations and stated that courts may
grant injunctive relief and "may also order restitution of moneys received in violation of any such
order or regulation." While acting pursuant to this authority, the DOE maintained that it was
seeking "restitution" of oil price overcharges. The DOE's adversaries strenuously contested this
characterization because it had a critical bearing on the bankruptcy penalty issue. See infra text
at notes 207-09. To avoid prejudging this question, this article will utilize the more neutral term
"disgorgement" instead of "restitution."
The constitutionality of the ESA was upheld by a three-judge court in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
(the "TECA") cited this decision with approval in University of Southern Cal. v. Cost of Living
Council, 472 F.2d 1065 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973). For the
full text of section 209 of the ESA, see infra note 32.
8. The DOE's efforts to force the oil companies to make "restitution" of illegal overcharges
which violated the Petroleum Price Regulations have yielded massive sums of money for the
federal and state governments, injured parties and consumers, setting various litigation records in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
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vent.9 Thereafter, the DOE's pursuit of "restitution"' ' 0 collided and com-
peted with the claims of the debtors' private creditors. The resultant
conflict gave rise to a novel legal issue: should a DOE claim for disgorge-
ment of illegal overcharge profits by an insolvent estate be deemed a
"penalty" and subordinated to other general unsecured claims pursuant
to section 726(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code?"
The protagonists in this conflict were the DOE and the bankruptcy
trustees. The Economic Stabilization Act (the "ESA") empowers the DOE
the process. On February 23, 1988, Texaco agreed to the largest settlement ever reached between
the federal government and a corporation; Texaco consented to pay $1.25 billion over 5 1/2 years.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
In 1987, Texaco set another unwelcome record when it lost the largest civil judgment in legal
history. A Texas court ordered it to pay Pennzoil $10.53 billion for acquiring Getty Oil Co. after
Getty had agreed to be acquired by Pennzoil. This judgment included $7.53 billion in compensatory
damages and $3 billion in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals for the First District in
Houston ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages award to $1 billion but otherwise affirmed
the trial court decision. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987).
Two months later, on April 12, 1987, Texaco filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On March 30, 1988, Texaco filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court, which was dismissed by agreement of the parties on April 7,
1988. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 748 S.W.2d 631 (Trex. Civ. App. 1988); Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1988). The parties then settled the case for more
than $3 billion. In view of the settlement, the Texas Court of Appeals granted the parties' motion
that it not issue mandate on its judgment and that it dismiss the case. Texaco, Inc., 748 S.W.2d
at 631. If Texaco had gone into liquidation under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the DOE's
claim would undoubtedly have raised the issue which is the subject of this article.
Prior to Texaco, Inc., the largest judgment in legal history was the DOE's victory over Exxon,
Pennzoil, Ashland Oil and various other oil companies in United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F.
Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 773 F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1105 (1986). When rendered, that judgment amounted to $1.635 billion, including interest.
Exxon eventually paid the DOE $2.1 billion in January 1987, after denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
At the time of the Texaco, Inc. settlement in February of 1988, ol companies had paid or
agreed to pay the DOE a total of $7.4 billion for price control violations and the DOE was still
seeking $900 million from other oil companies. In addition to the sums from Exxon and Texaco,
the $7.4 billion figure includes $408 million from Amoco, $380 million from Arco, and $180
million from Shell, as well as another $1.4 billion from the "Stripper Well Settlement," to be
paid by Exxon, Texaco, Amoco, Gulf, Arco and thirty other refiners and producers. Id.; In re
Stripper Well Litigation, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 26,445 (D. Kan. 1983).
9. The dramatic proliferation of oil resellers during the period of the petroleum price
regulations and the demise of so many of them shortly after decontrol suggests that many if not
most of the new companies were founded with the specific purpose of making money by violating
and evading the regulations. SuBco a -ar R EPoRT at 5.
10. As indicated supra at note 7, section 209 of the ESA authorized courts to order "restitution"
of profits resulting from violation of price control regulations promulgated pursuant to the ESA.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1978). See infra text accompanying note 66. All Bankruptcy Code
provisions discussed herein are part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549. In seeking to defeat the DOE's claims, the bankruptcy trustees argued that the
claims constituted "penalties" which should be subordinated pursuant to §726(a)(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in distribution of the estate's assets. Because there is overwhelming case law authority
that "restitution" is not a "penalty" (cf. infra text at notes 207-35), the logic of the trustees'
position required them to deny that the DOE claims were for "restitution."
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to enforce the price regulations, go after violators and seek disgorgement
of overcharges.' 2 Like other federal agencies, it is authorized to pursue
claims based on statutory obligations as a "creditor" in bankruptcy cases.' 3
The trustees have the statutory duty of representing the estate and protecting
the interests of the creditors.' 4 They have uniformly opposed DOE over-
charge claims and argued that such claims were "penalties" which should
be subordinated pursuant to section 726(a)(4). 5 The DOE section 726(a)(4)
penalty issue has been decided to date by several federal bankruptcy and
federal district courts but by only one court of appeals. 16 The court of
appeals decision, DOE v. West Texas Marketing Corp.,7 by the TECA,'8
12. See supra note 7.
13. According to COLLIER ON B aupTcy, "The United States is a creditor not only with
respect to public exactions for revenue purposes such as income taxes but also with respect to
statutory obligations enforceable by a federal administrative agency in the public interest for the
benefit of private parties." 2 Couea oN BANxuPTcy 1 101.09 (L. King 15th ed. 1987). As one
bankruptcy court stated, "As defined in § 101(9)(A) [of the Bankruptcy Code] 'creditor' includes
any 'entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for
relief concerning the debtor.' Section 101(4) [of the Bankruptcy Code] defines 'claim' as a 'right
to payment' while section 101(14) defines 'entity' to include a 'governmental unit.' Thus, in its
representative capacity, the DOE meets the definition of a creditor under the Bankruptcy Code."
In re West Texas Marketing Corp., 82 Bankr. 839, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
Several other decisions have allowed government agencies to pursue claims on behalf of private
citizens in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952) (NLRB was the proper
holder of a claim for employees' back pay, and claim should be treated as a general unsecured
claim); In re Berry Estates, Inc., 49 Bankr. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New York State Division of
Housing and Community Renewal deemed a "creditor as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(a)" which
could pursue a bankruptcy claim for excess rents in violation of state and local rent control laws
on behalf of the overcharged tenants); In re Bradbury, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 263 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1978) (State allowed to maintain a claim in bankruptcy on behalf of Kansas consumers to
enforce the state's Consumer Protection Act).
14. The trustee has a fiduciary duty to creditors under the Bankruptcy Code to protect and
defend the assets of the insolvent estate and this clearly entails combatting unfounded claims. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 704 (1978).
15. The author is unaware of a single such case in which the trustee has failed to oppose the
DOE claim.
16. The TECA held that the DOE's claim for disgorgement of overcharges was for restitution
and not a penalty and should not be subordinated pursuant to section 726(a)(4) in DOE v. West
Texas Marketing Corp. [WTM], 763 F.2d 1411 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). Accord DOE v.
Gratex Corp., 66 Bankr. 209 (N.D. Tex. 1986), appealfiled, No. 86-1436 (5th Cir. June 12, 1986);
In re Independent Ref. Corp., 65 Bankr. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Seneca Oil Co., 76
Bankr. 818 (W.D. Okla. 1987); In re Compton Corp., 90 Bankr. 798 (N.D. Tex. 1988), reversing
40 Bankr. 875 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984). In In re O'Connor, 67 Bankr. 538 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1986), appeal dismissed, 85 Bankr. 590 (W.D. Okla. 1987), the court held that section 726 was
inapplicable because it was a chapter 11 proceeding and also refused to equitably subordinate the
DOE's claim. Id. at 541.
17. 763 F.2d 1411 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). The author litigated DOE v. WTM as a
trial attorney for the regulatory litigation section of the DOE's Office of General Counsel in the
Bankruptcy Court in Abilene, Texas and Federal District Court in Dallas, Texas but left the
agency before the appeal to the TECA was litigated.
18. The DOE's position is that the TECA has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the
"penalty" issue by virtue of the ESA. See infra note 147. Nevertheless, in a subsequent federal
district court decision which also held in the DOE's favor on the identical penalty issue, the DOE's
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
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is typical of the penalty issue cases and will be utilized herein as a case
study of the section 726(a)(4) penalty issue.
Introduction to the Problem
Distribution of the assets of a debtor's estate to creditors under chapter
7 is governed by section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 726 establishes
six general categories for such distribution in descending order of priority.
Fines, penalties, forfeitures, and multiple exemplary and punitive damages
are assigned fourth priority, 19 while general unsecured claims receive second
priority. 2°
Designating the DOE's claim as a "penalty" subject to section 726(a)(4)
would effectively achieve the trustees' objective of barring the DOE from
recovery. This is because all claims at a given level of priority must be paid
in full before the claims at the next lower level of priority receive any
payment, and it is likely that the estate's assets would be exhausted by
distribution to the general unsecured creditors pursuant to sections 726(a)(2)
and (3). On the other hand, if the DOE succeeded in avoiding the "penalty"
label, its claim would receive second priority and would thus be placed on
a par with the claims of unsecured creditors, whose recovery from the
estate's assets would diminish proportionately. Thus, the question whether
the DOE's claim was a "penalty" became the pivotal issue in a "zero sum
game" which pitted the DOE against the trustee and the other creditors.
The resultant conflict between the interests of the creditors and the interests
of the public in enforcement of the law and in restitution of illegal gains
provides an interesting case study of the interplay between two federal
regulatory schemes, bankruptcy and energy price controls.
As indicated above, the TECA held in the DOE's favor on the section
726(a)(4) penalty issue in DOE v. WTM .2 The DOE's claim in the WTM
bankruptcy case was based on a "Proposed Remedial Order"("PRO") 22
which the Economic Regulatory Administration of the DOE filed against
adversaries have taken an appeal to the Tenth Circuit, which has reserved decision on both the
jurisdictional issue and the merits. In re Seneca Oil Co., 76 Bankr. 818 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 65-76.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2)-(3) (1978).
21. See supra note 16.
22. A PRO is an initial finding by the Economic Regulatory Administration of the DOE that
the price regulations have been violated, together with a proposed plan of repayment. 10 C.F.R.
§ 205.192 (1987). If not successfully contested administratively, a PRO ripens into a "Remedial
Order" which requires the company concerned to make repayment, either to the DOE or to the
private party or parties overcharged. 10 C.F.R. § 205.199B (1987). Remedial Orders, which permit
the governmental agency to resolve violations of the price control regulations and to impose
remedies without suing in federal court, had been utilized by the Cost of Living Council and were
adopted by the Federal Energy Office and its successors. See Note, Refunding Overcharges Under
the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act: The Evolution of a Compensatory Obligation, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 1454, 1459-60 (1981). The use of Remedial Orders was effectively upheld in Bonray Oil
Co. v. DOE, 472 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 601 F.2d 1191 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1979).
1989]
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WTM on September 30, 1982.23 The PRO charged WTM, PetroTech Trading
Company ("PetroTech"), three of WTM's officers and the president of
PetroTech with illegally selling and reselling crude oil at excessive prices in
violation of applicable price control regulations. The DOE alleged that
consumers had been overcharged by approximately $16 million as a result
and demanded that WTM disgorge that amount plus interest to the govern-
ment.
The DOE had been investigating WTM and related companies for some
time, and in April 1981, the investigation led to voluntary guilty pleas to
felonies by the two principals of WTM. 24 On May 14, 1982, probably as a
result of pressures flowing from the government investigation, WTM filed
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under chapter 11 in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. On the basis of the
PRO, the DOE on November 23, 1982, filed a proof of claim in WTM's
bankruptcy case for some $22 million,25 which the TECA ultimately gave
second priority as a general unsecured claim under section 726(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
The question whether the DOE's claim against WTM for a refund of
price control overcharges should instead be subordinated as a "penalty"
under section 726(a)(4) was an issue of first impression under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. The TECA's discussion of the "penalty" issue in DOE
v. WTM, however, was perfunctory. It comprised only two paragraphs of
a fifteen-page decision and cited only two cases, neither one a bankruptcy
case. 26 While the author believes that the TECA's decision is correct, the
23. Economic Regulatory Administration, DOE, PRO, Case No. 650X00314 (Houston, Texas,
Sept. 30, 1982).
24. See infra text accompanying note 46.
25. See W7M, 763 F.2d at 1413.
26. The TECA stated:
The DOE's claim is clearly for restitution and not for a penalty. The Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act... has specific sections which deal with civil and criminal
penalties .... The DOE did not seek these penalties. Instead, the DOE sought
restitution under the authority of § 209 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970
... as incorporated in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1972 .... This
statute states "the court may order restitution of moneys received in violation of
any such order or reglation [sic]." By virtue of the statutory scheme and the
regulations issued pursuant thereto, DOE may collect such restitution on behalf of
persons suffering loss from overcharges through remedial orders, consent decrees,
or actions in the district court.
W7M, 763 F.2d at 1426 (citations omitted).
In subsequently denying WTM's petition for rehearing, the court stated even more emphatically
that:
[The] DOE's claim is for single, not multiple, recovery of overcharges. To the extent
proved it is for funds which'were never rightfully assets of the corporation. In no
respect does it bear any relationship to the penalty provisions of the statute or the
regulations issued pursuant thereto. It is so manifestly restitutionary in character and
not for a penalty as to render further discussion of the point unwarranted.
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing at 2, DOE v. WTM, No. 5-111 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
June 24, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
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court's conclusory treatment of the "penalty" issue gives it little persuasive
force. The purpose of this article is to more thoroughly investigate the
underlying issues and relevant case law, thereby demonstrating the correct-
ness of the court's conclusion.
The Price Control Statute and the Regulatory Scheme
The Mandatory Petroleum Price and Allocation Regulations27 were in
effect from August 22, 1973 until January 28, 1981 .28 To combat inflation,
Congress enacted the ESA, 29 which authorized the President to "issue such
orders and regulations as he deems appropriate ... to ... stabilize prices." 30
Pursuant to this authority, the Cost of Living Council promulgated price
control regulations for all sectors of the petroleum industry.31 The regulations
remained in effect under the Cost of Living Council's successor agencies,
the last of which was the DOE.
The ESA further authorized those entrusted with enforcement of the price
regulations to ask the Attorney General to seek injunctive price relief against
their violation.3 2 The ESA conferred jurisdiction on the federal district courts
to hear such cases, to grant injunctive relief and to "order restitution of
moneys received in violation of any such order or regulation.
'33
27. 10 C.F.R. §§ 205, 210, 212 (1987).
28. See supra note 3.
29. See supra note 7,
30. ESA, § 203(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969).
31. 6 C.F.R. Part 150, Subpart L, 38 Fed. Reg. 22,536 (Aug.22, 1973).
32. ESA, § 209. Section 209 provides as follows:
Whenever it appears to any person authorized by the President to exercise authority
under this title that any individual or organization has engaged, is engaged, or is
about to engage in any acts or practices constituting a violation of any order or
regulation under this title, such person may request the Attorney General to bring
an action in the appropriate district court of the United States to enjoin such acts
or practices, and upon a proper showing a temporary restraining order or a prelim-
inary or permanent injunction shall be granted without bond. Any such court may
also issue mandatory injunctions commanding any person to comply with any such
order or regulation. In addition to such injunctive relief, the court may also order
restitution of moneys received in violation of any such order or regulation.
This statute bears a striking resemblance to and was apparently modeled after section 205(a) of
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which provided:
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute a violation of any provision of
§ 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an order
enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator
that such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted
without bond.
In 1947, Congress amended the Emergency Price Control Act with respect to rent overcharges and
codified Warner Holding Co. by adding an express provision authorizing the federal government
to bring actions for restitution. See infra note 144.
33. ESA, § 209. The legislative history of section 209 indicates that the explicit reference to
restitution was to make clear that "[t]here was an inherent equitable power in the court to set
things right and order restitution." S. REP. No. 507, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1971
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 2283, 2291.
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On November 27, 1973, after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ("OPEC") declared an oil embargo, Congress passed the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (the "EPAA") 3 4 to ensure a fair
allocation of available petroleum supplies at "equitable prices. ' 35 Power to
enforce the regulations ultimately passed from the Cost of Living Council
to the DOE, created on September 15, 1977.36 While allocation controls
were added, the price controls on oil remained largely the same during this
period.
The oil price regulatory scheme was intended to prevent American prod-
ucers from benefiting from the sharp run-up in the price of imported oil
caused by the OPEC Oil Embargo. Accordingly, price ceilings were placed
on "old" oil from domestic wells already in production. On the other hand,
Congress did not wish to discourage exploration for and exploitation of
new sources. Thus, "new" oil (and of necessity, all imported oil) was not
subject to the ceilings and could instead be sold at the much higher market
price. 3
7
In order to enforce the price ceilings, the regulations required each seller
of oil to certify the "tier" or status of the oil sold. 3 The regulations also
limited permissible markups upon resale of oil beginning on January 1,
1978. 39 Resellers were limited to average markups, and they were prohibited
from increasing prices at all upon resale unless they performed a "service
or other function traditionally and historically associated with the resale of
crude oil."'' In addition, firms were forbidden from engaging in any practice
designed to obtain prices in excess of those permitted by the regulations. 4'
While it perhaps made theoretical sense, this rather complex price control
scheme had serious drawbacks from a practical standpoint. The fact that
oil is fungible, whatever its legal category and price, and that its correct
price classification could only be determined through accompanying docu-
mentation presented ample opportunity for fraud by sellers. Furthermore,
the fact that uncontrolled or "new" oil was selling for as much as six times
the amount of controlled "old" oil created the opportunity for vast profits
for those willing to engage in fraudulent conduct. 42 It is widely agreed,
34. See supra note 7.
35. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(F) (1975).
36. Executive Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,267 (1977). For a good capsule summary of
the evolution of all of the administrative agencies with responsibility for enforcing the energy price
regulations, see Note, Refunding Overcharges Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act:
The Evolution of a Compensatory Obligation, 79 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1454, 1459 n.27 (1981).
37. 6 C.F.R. § 150.354 (1987). Congress subsequently added a third "tier"-with an inter-
mediate price-which applied to amounts of oil from pre-existing wells in excess of their production
level during a base period (originally 1972, later 1975). 10 C.F.R. § 212.72, 41 Fed. Reg. 4,931
(Feb. 3, 1976).
38. 10 C.F.R. § 212.131 (1987).
39. 10 C.F.R. Part 212, Subpart L, §§ 212.182, 212.183 (1987).
40. 10 C.F.R. § 212.186 (1987). Increasing prices without performing any useful service was
called "layering."
41. 10 C.F.R. § 210.62(c) (1987).
42. In late 1979, the first sale price of "old" or lower tier oil averaged about $5.75 per barrel,
[Vol. 42
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moreover, that Congress had not given the DOE and its predecessors
adequate auditing resources to police enforcement of the regulations.
43
Fraudulent violation of the oil price control regulations resulted on a
massive scale, apparently concentrated among resellers in Texas and neigh-
boring oil-producing states. The number of reseller companies, which had
been fewer than ten prior to the implementation of price controls, mush-
roomed to more than 400 in the late 1970s. 44 Many observers suspected that
the reseller companies were created not to fill any economic need but for
the sole purpose of profiting from violation of the price control regulations.
As noted above, the price regulations required each seller of oil to "certify"
in writing its regulatory price category to each buyer,4 5 and the key to such
illegal profits was to certify "old" or "lower tier" oil as "new," "upper
tier" or exempt oil, thereby increasing by as much as 500% the price for
which the oil would sell.
This illegal miscertification or "flipping" of the certification often took
place in the middle of a long series of paper transactions through which
the oil was sold back and forth among different resellers as often as twenty
times. The majority of these transactions occurred without delivery of the
oil by the seller to the purchaser, i.e., while it was traveling through a
pipeline. Because the certification of the type of oil sold had to be changed
only once for the illegal profits to be made, the majority of the sales in
the resulting "daisy chain" were nominally legal. The multiplication of such
sales transactions produced a corresponding multiplication of sales and
certification documents, creating a veritable paper blizzard which greatly
complicated investigation and identification of the fraud. Nevertheless, the
diligent efforts of DOE auditors in pursuit of such fraud began to bear
while upper tier oil averaged about $17.50 per barrel and uncontrolled ("new") oil averaged $34.75
per barrel. See STrscommrB REPORT at 8.
43. This proposition is bolstered by the fact that many of the major price control enforcement
cases only reached fruition during the Reagan Administration, after the pertinent regulations had
been abolished. See supra note 3. It is incontrovertible that the price control regulations were
issued under crisis conditions, during the national emergency caused by the 1973 Arab oil embargo.
Congress hastily enacted the EPAA, which created and directed the Federal Energy Office to
promulgate regulations to ensure a fair allocation of available petroleum supplies at "equitable
prices." EPAA, § 4(b)(l)(F) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(F)) (1975)).
It appears that Congress did not foresee the massive level of fraud and violation of the price
regulations which would result and, in retrospect, that the auditing resources devoted to enforcement
of the new regulations were inadequate. In the author's opinion, the likelihood of such fraud was
greatly increased by the nature of the pricing system chosen. This system was tailored to the
history and circumstances of individual producers, thus resulting in an infinite variety of legal
price levels for the same product in the marketplace. A fixed nationwide price for all oil of the
same quality, while arbitrary and less equitable, would have been harder to violate.
44. SUBcoM=TE REPORT at 5. WTM was incorporated in May 1978; it "bought and sold,
and then rebought and resold, over 18 million barrels of domestic crude oil in instantaneous back-
to-back 'in-line' transfers." Appellant's Brief and Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at
5, DOE v. WTM, 763 F.2d 1411 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
45. 10 C.F.R. § 212.131 (1987).
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fruit in the early 1980s. One of the first cases to become ready for admin-
istrative enforcement was DOE v. WTM.
WTM'S Violation of the Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations
On April 2, 1981, John T. Troland, Chairman of the Board and President
of WTM, and David W. Ratliff, the company's Executive Vice President,
pled guilty to criminal offenses involving violation of the price control
regulations. Both men were sentenced to fourteen months in prison and
ordered to pay fines of $10,000.46 They were found guilty of violating 18
U.S.C. § 100147 by certifying that there were no barrels of lower tier crude
oil in a representative sale in October 1979 of 77,500 barrels of oil to
PetroTech, although both knew that all of the barrels were lower tier oil.
Subsequently, on May 14, 1982, WTM filed for bankruptcy under chapter
11, and the DOE issued its PRO against WTM, PetroTech and four of
their officers on September 30, 1982.48
The PRO charged that WTM and PetroTech did not perform any service
or other useful economic function in connection with their purchases and
sales of crude oil in May and June, 1979. Rather, it alleged the entire
trading system was directed at extracting profits in violation of the regula-
tions without performing any such function. The system operated with
WTM initially purchasing oil in all three categories (lower tier, upper tier
and exempt) which it sold to PetroTech with the appropriate regulatory
certifications. PetroTech sold the same volumes of oil to BPM, a Tulsa,
Oklahoma reseller, without changing the certifications. BPM then sold back
to PetroTech the same volumes of crude oil, the certifications of which had
been altered so as to indicate that the oil was 100% exempt.49 PetroTech
46. United States v. Troland, No. 81-CR-23-E (N.D. Okla. Apr. 2, 1981). WTM had a long
history of resisting compliance with DOE regulations.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly or willingly falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
This statute was applied against oil companies falsely certifying the price category of crude oil.
See United States v. Uni Oil, 646 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982);
United States v. Wolf, 645 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1981).
48. PRO, Case No. 650X00314, supra note 23, at 13.
49. Id. at 11. BPM was controlled by Robert Sutton. According to Reuters' Washington
Dateline, Aug. 29, 1986, "Sutton and his various affiliated companies in Oklahoma and the
Bahamas were allegedly the largest violators of government oil price regulations, with more than
$1.2 billion in overcharges." In 1980, Sutton was prosecuted on racketeering and fraud charges
in "the largest criminal case, in dollar terms, ever brought by the Department of Justice against
one man." FoaBs MAGAZNE at 14 (Sept. 24, 1984). After the court threw out the racketeering
and fraud charges and found Sutton guilty of the lesser charge of obstruction of justice, the DOE
brought a civil action seeking restitution of some $763 million in overcharges for violation of the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
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then sold the same volumes to WTM, which sold them to its customers as
100% exempt. In sum, WTM and PetroTech sold the identical barrels of
oil twice, once at the beginning of the chain of paper transactions and once
at the end, but at different prices and with different certifications.
50
The PRO further charged that WTM and PetroTech raised the price of
the oil each time they sold it without performing any economic function.
The oil was flowing through the pipeline while the numerous sales occurred;
therefore, no other service regarding the oil could be performed. WTM
added $.50 per barrel for "gathering," but performed no "gathering" or
related activities with regard to the sale. PetroTech added $.15 per barrel
when it sold oil to BPM and $.50 per barrel after it repurchased the same
oil from BPM and resold it to WTM, without even alleging or specifying
in the sales certificate any useful service it had performed.
5'
It appears that the purpose of this maze of transactions involving the
same oil was twofold. First, every resale provided at least a surface justi-
fication for adding a markup to the price of the oil. Second, the volume
of resales which made the entire scheme feasible buried the illegal "flipping"
of certifications somewhere midway in the "daisy chain." Among a large
number of ostensibly legal transactions, it was more difficult for auditors
to trace the illegal certification. The net result was obvious. Consumers,
whom this regulation was designed to shield from higher prices, paid
unregulated and far higher market prices for large quantities of oil.52 The
regulations were violated, the regulatory scheme was frustrated, and the
benefits of this fraud went not to the producers but rather to middlemen
conducting paper transactions with no useful economic function.
The Bankruptcy Case
The DOE's PRO against WTM demanded that WTM "refund" over-
charges of $16,360,315.48 (plus interest totalling $6,875,397.23) for layering
or, in the alternative, $15,929,396.53 (plus interest totalling $6,683,344.99)
for "circumvention and contravention" of the regulations.53 The DOE's
Mandatory Petroleum Price and Allocation Regulations. Sutton was found personally responsible
for more than $210 million in overcharges (plus some $212 million in accumulated interest) for
such violations and the Court ordered that he make restitution of $423 million. United States v.
Sutton, N. 1, 82-C-1069-B (N.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 1984), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1040 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
The government never collected this judgment, "the largest ever imposed against an individual
sued by a government entity," (LEGAL Tiams at 3 (Mar. 18, 1985)), because the debt was discharged
in Sutton's chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Jereski, Minus-Centi-Millionaire No More, Foasa
MAGAziNE at 8 (Oct. 26, 1987). Sutton did, however, serve thirty months in federal prison for
obstruction of justice and on a subsequent conviction for bribing a DOE attorney. Id.
50. PRO, Case No. 650X00314, supra note 23, at 11.
51. Id. at 11-13.
52. As indicated supra at note 3, a congressional subcommittee estimated that such frauds cost
consumers $2.2 billion for one eighteen-month period alone.
53. PRO, Case No. 650X00314, supra note 23, at 19-22; DOE v. WTM, 763 F.2d 1411, 1413-
14 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
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procedural regulations provided ample opportunity for WTM to contest the
PRO before the DOE's Office of Hearings and Appeals. If not so contested,
the PRO would automatically ripen into a Remedial Order with a legally
binding order of disgorgement.54 The response of WTM's trustee in bank-
ruptcy was to argue that any such administrative proceedings by the DOE
to liquidate or fix its claim against WTM were in violation of 11 U.S.C. §
362, the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code; that the DOE's
proof of claim should be disallowed because it had been tardily filed; and
that even if it were accepted, the DOE claim should be subordinated
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) or equitably subordinated pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 510(c)(1).
55
Bankruptcy Judge Bill Brister did not directly respond to the trustee's
argument that the DOE's administrative proceedings were automatically
stayed pursuant to section 362 by commencement of the bankruptcy case.
6
In a Memorandum and Order, he did, however, utilize the "discretionary
stay" provision, 11 U.S.C. § 105, to bar the DOE from proceeding with
the administrative case against WTM until the bankruptcy subordination
issue had been decided by the bankruptcy court.
5 7
54. Cf. 10 C.F.R. Part 205, Subpart 0, §§ 205.192, 205.193, 205.196, 205.199B (1987).
55. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, WTM v. DOE, No. 182-00034, Adversary No. 183-00033
(Bankr. N.D. Tex., filed Apr. 29, 1983); Memorandum re Department of Energy Claim No. 38,
at 3-6, 10-21. In re WTM, No. 182-00034 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 21, 1983). The trustee
later abandoned the equitable subordination argument. See infra note 60.
56. The Bankruptcy Code provides that filing of a voluntary or involuntary petition in
bankruptcy operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under
this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1978).
Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, exempts from the automatic stay provision
"the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1978). Section
362(b)(5) exempts "the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an
action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power . .. ." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1978). Two courts have held an administrative proceeding
by the DOE to determine whether oil price regulations have been violated to be exempt from the
automatic stay provision under section 362(b)(4). In re Vantage Petroleum Corp., 25 Bankr. 471
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re County Fuel Co., 29 Bankr. 534 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983).
57. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states: "The bankruptcy court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1978). Judge Brister's "temporary injunction" stated:
The court concludes pursuant to § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code that Department
[sic] of Energy, its attorneys, agents, employees and successors should be temporarily
restrained and enjoined from proceeding or continuing in any manner the admin-
istrative proceedings against the debtor until a reasonable time has elapsed after the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
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In a second Memorandum and Order entered on June 21, 1983, Judge
Brister rejected the trustee's contention that the DOE's proof of claim in
bankruptcy had been tardily filed.5 8 This was a hollow victory for the DOE,
however, because Judge Brister's next decision concluded that the DOE's
claim must be subordinated under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4).59 According to
Judge Brister:
[T]he words of the statute are clear. If DOE suffered no actual
pecuniary damages its claim must be subordinated to the claims
of those creditors who did suffer actual pecuniary damages.
I conclude that the claim of DOE, while timely filed, should
be subordinated in distribution under § 726(a)(4) to those claims
evidenced by § 726(a)(1), (2) and (3). 60
After the DOE moved for reconsideration of this subordination deci-
sion, Judge Brister on August 9, 1983, issued an "Additional Finding"
which made explicit what had been implicit in his earlier order, that the
DOE's claim was for a "penalty" which should be subordinated pur-
suant to 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4). 6 1 The DOE appealed Judge Brister's
timeliness of filing of claim issue and the two subordination issues have been
resolved by this court.
Memorandum and Order, WTM v. DOE, No. 182-00034, Adversary No. 183-00033 at 5 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. May 11, 1983).
58. WTM v. DOE, No. 182-0034 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 21, 1983).
59. Because the claims of WTM's other general unsecured creditors exceeded the funds in the
estate, the DOE's $22 million claim would yield a payout of zero upon liquidation if it were
subordinated and given fourth priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4).
60. Memorandum and Order, WTM v. DOE, No.182-00034, Adversary No. 183-00033 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. June 21, 1983). Judge Brister's decision to subordinate the DOE's claim pursuant to
section 726(a)(4) made it unnecessary for him to reach the trustee's alternative argument that the
claim should be equitably subordinated pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). The trustee subsequently
abandoned the equitable subordination argument, which was untenable in view of the fact that
the courts have uniformly required a showing of fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of a
claimant before his claim could 'be equitably subordinated-and no such allegation could be
sustained with regard to the DOE. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Holt v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America,
712 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Bellucci, 29 Bankr. 814, 815 (Bankr. Ist Cir. 1983);
Wright v. United States, 75 Bankr. 387 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
61. Additional Finding, WTM v. DOE, No. 182-00034 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 1983).
Judge Brister stated: "In reviewing my order of June 21, 1983, I failed to find that anywhere in
that order did I specifically state that the claim evidenced by the proof filed by the DOE was a
penalty, fine or forfeiture or represented a claim for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages.
However, the finding that the proof of claim is a penalty is certainly implied, if not expressed,
in that memorandum and order. Therefore, the order heretofore entered should be supplemented
with this additional finding ... the claim evidenced by the proof of claim filed by Department
[sic] of Energy and challenged by the trustee, is a penalty." Id. at 2. Judge Brister, accepting the
trustee's argument that profits disgorged by price control violators went to the DOE and were not
returned to the injured consumers, also rejected the DOE's contention that its claim against WTM
was for restitution. Id. at 2-3.
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decision, 62 which was subsequently affirmed by United States District
Judge David Belew.6 3 The DOE appealed this decision to the TECA,
which reversed it. 4 The balance of this article will analyze the various
facets of the question whether the DOE's claim was for a penalty and
consequently must be subordinated under section 726(a)(4).
The "Fine, Penalty or Forfeiture" Subordination Provision
The starting point in construing the "fine, penalty or forfeiture" provision
is the language of the statute itself.65 Section 726(a)(4) subordinates "pay-
ment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages...
to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages aie not com-
pensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim." 66
A claim which is given this classification is near the bottom of the list in
order of distribution, preceded by a long list of claims with higher priority. 67
The only lower priorities in liquidation are those for payment of post petition
interest 68 and payment to the debtor himself.69
Section 726(a)(4) was clearly patterned after section 57j of the former
Bankruptcy Act, which provided:
Debts owing to the United States or to any State or any subdivision
thereof as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for
the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction,
or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with
reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest
62. The WTM bankruptcy case was brought under chapter 11. DOE appealed Judge Brister's
decision on a second ground-that section 726(a)(4) does not apply to chapter 11 cases. See In re
O'Connor, 67 Bankr. 538, 541 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986); In re Colin, 44 Bankr. 806 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984). This point became moot when District Judge Belew granted the trustee's subsequent
motion to convert the case to a chapter 7 (liquidation) proceeding.
63. The district court had jurisdiction of the bankruptcy appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
158(a). Judge Belew, in affirming his June 21, 1983 decision, adopted Judge Brister's opinion.
No. 1-83-73K (N.D. Tex. July 26, 1984). See DOE v. VTM, 763 F.2d 1411, 1413 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1985).
64. DOE v. WTM, 763 F.2d at 1413.
65. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);
American Textile vffrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508 (1981).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1978) (emphasis supplied).
67. Under the Bankruptcy Code, highest priority in distribution of the debtor's estate assets is
given under section 726(a)(1) to six types of claims described in section 507, such as administrative
expenses, certain wage claims up to $2000 per person, contributions owed to employee benefit
plans, and various taxes. The next highest priorities in distribution are for the mass of general
unsecured claims not included in other special categories and then for tardily filed unsecured
claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2), (3) (1978). Obviously, in the vast majority of cases, the estate's
assets will be exhausted by distribution to these claimants, leaving nothing for distribution under
section 726(a)(4).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1978).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
19891 FEDERAL OIL PRICE CONTROLS 397
as may have accrued on the amount of such loss according to
law. 
7 0
The Supreme Court interpreted section 57j as follows:
[I]t plainly manifests a congressional purpose to bar all claims of
any kind against a bankrupt except those based on a 'pecuniary'
loss. So understood, this section, which has been a part of the
Bankruptcy Act since its enactment in 1898, is in keeping with the
broad aim of the Act to provide for the conservation of the estates
of insolvents to the end that there may be as equitable a distribution
of assets as is consistent with the policy of the penalty provisions
themselves. Tax penalties are imposed at least in part as punitive
measures against persons who have been guilty of some default or
wrong. Enforcement of penalties against the estates of bankrupts,
however, would serve not to punish the delinquent taxpayer but
rather their entirely innocent creditors.
7
1
Similarly, Congress' intent in enacting section 726(a)(4) was to protect unse-
cured creditors from "the debtor's wrongdoing." 2
The DOE itself, of course, was not the victim of WTM's illegal acts, and
it conceded from the outset that "it has not itself suffered actual pecuniary
loss here."'7  Unlike the other creditors in the WTM bankruptcy case, the
DOE was seeking to recover not for its own account but rather on behalf of
the consumers of petroleum products who had suffered pecuniary loss by
being forced to pay higher prices for such products as a result of WTM's
illegal activities.74 The DOE's concession meant that the second clause of
section 726(a)(4) concerning "pecuniary loss" was irrelevant to the case and
had to be disregarded.75 Because the trustee did not make (nor could he
70. Section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 930), repealed 1978) (emphasis
supplied). This section had not changed in substance since 1898. There is a major difference
between the two sections: section 57j totally barred payment of claims based on penalties and
forfeitures; section 726(a)(4) merely subordinates them to most other claims.
71. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1962) (citing United States v. Childs, 266 U.S.
304, 307 (1924)).
72. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (1977).
73. Brief of Appellant DOE at 5 n.3, DOE v. WTM, No. 1-83-73K (N.D. Tex. July 26, 1984).
The DOE was simply fulfilling its statutory mandate to enforce the Mandatory Petroleum Price
and Allocation Regulations. See ESA, at § 209, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969); EPAA, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 751, 753, 754, 755, 757.
Interestingly, the TECA itself had stated that the precise kind of overcharges committed by
WTM not only defrauded the oil purchasers but also defrauded the United States. This injury,
however, is not measured by a precise amount of pecuniary loss. See United States v. Zang, 645
F.2d 999, 1007 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981).
74. The DOE is a significant purchaser of petroleum products for its ovm account, and an
argument could have been made that it shared in the price increases to the general public which
resulted from WTM's activities. Any such injury to the DOE, however, would have constituted
only a minuscule portion of its $22 million claim.
75. The reason for this is simple. While most claims involving "any fine, penalty, or forfeiture
." are subject to the relatively unfavorable treatment provided by section 726(a)(4), claims
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plausibly make) any claim that what the DOE was seeking was "a fine, ...
forfeiture, or ... multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages," 7 6 the entire
case reduced itself to the pivotal issue of whether the DOE's claim was for
a "penalty" under section 726(a)(4). The only way the DOE could avoid
subordination (and a zero payment on its claim) was to demonstrate that it
was not seeking a "penalty." Once the DOE's claim was denominated a
"penalty," subordination was automatic.
Do DOE Demands for Repayment of Price Control Overcharges Constitute
"Penalty" Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code?
As indicated above, DOE v. WTM was a case of first impression. No
other court had determined whether claims like that of the DOE against
WTM were for "penalties" under either section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act
or section 726(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. While relevant authority is
sparse, the natural starting point in addressing this issue is the bankruptcy
case law construing and applying the two sections. This section will discuss
the most pertinent cases under both of the above statutes which have decided
whether a given claim is a "penalty" for bankruptcy purposes.
77
The bankruptcy case most similar to DOE v. W7TM is In re Maier Brewing
Co. 78 In Maier, the debtor corporation had sold beer at prices exceeding the
ceiling prices established under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
The Office of Price Administration sought treble damages for the over-
charges. 79 When the Office of Price Administration reached a compromise
settlement with the trustee, the debtor corporation opposed this, arguing that
the Office of Price Administration was seeking a penalty which it could not
enforce against the debtor's estate. The court rejected this argument. It
based on "compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim" are
specifically excepted and would thus receive the more favorable classification for general unsecured
claims provided by section 726(a)(2) or (3). See supra note 67. Because the DOE, as "holder" of
the claim against WTM, had not itself suffered "pecuniary loss," it could not benefit from this
second clause. Consequently, if the DOE's claim against WTM were characterized as a "penalty,"
there would be no way to avoid its being subordinated pursuant to section 726(a)(4).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1978).
77. It must of course be borne in mind that "a satisfactory and clear-cut formula to separate
penalties from nonpenalties has not yet been agreed upon by the courts." 3 CouIMR ON BANc-
RupTcy 57.2212], at 387 (14th ed. 1975). Accord In re Kline, 403 F. Supp. 974, 977 (D. Md.
1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977).
78. 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1288 (No. 37544-H, S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1944), printed in Opinions
and Decisions - Opinions of the Price Administrator and Decisions of the Federal and State Courts
on Price Control - Rent Control - Rationing (Office of Price Administration, undated).
79. Id. at 1289-90. Unfortunately, the obscure decision is only one and one-half pages long
and adopts the facts stated in the Office of Price Administration's brief without even summarizing
them. Section 925(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provided that persons selling at
prices in excess of the legal ceilings were liable for treble damages in actions brought either by
the buyer or by the Office of Price Administration.
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concluded that the Office of Price Administration would probably prevail if
the issue were litigated and accordingly approved the compromise settlement.80
Apparently the only other bankruptcy case which addresses the question
whether disgorgement of unjust enrichment constitutes a disallowable "pen-
alty" under section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act8' is United States v. Wagner.82
The Commodity Credit Corporation (the "CCC") had paid the debtor to
store wheat which was commingled with wheat owned by others in the debtor's
grain elevator. When the CCC ordered its wheat shipped, 16,800 bushels were
discovered missing. While the CCC was to be paid in full for this shortage,
it further sought reimbursement of $17,099.20 it had paid for the storage of
the 16,800 bushels under the terms of the storage contract.83 The district
court, upholding the ruling of the referee, disallowed this claim on the grounds
that the government had suffered no pecuniary loss, and that to allow the
claim would penalize the other creditors.Y4
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
court agreed that while section 17(d) would authorize a refund of all storage
charges for the 16,800 bushels in a contract case, bankruptcy law did not
permit such a refund. It would constitute a penalty in bankruptcy to require
the debtor to refund charges for the period before the conversion, during
which time the grain was actually in storage and services were provided. The
Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding, however, as to the govern-
ment's claim for reimbursement of storage charges for the period after the
conversion, because the debtor had provided no services to earn these fees.
The court's rationale reflects the distinction between disgorgement or resti-
tution of unearned charges, on the one hand, and penalties, on the other:
We agree that the bankrupt cannot retain charges for periods
during which the wheat was not being stored. Such an allowance
would constitute unjust enrichment ....
By storing and caring for the wheat, Cheyenne Wells performed
a service for which it was entitled to be paid, and indeed it was
paid. Upon conversion of the wheat, however, Cheyenne Wells no
longer stored nor cared for it, no services were performed nor
charges earned. When conversion of the wheat occurred, Section
17(d) became effective and by its terms demanded the return of
all storage charges paid; however, Section 17(d) exacts a penalty
only to the extent it requires the return of charges actually earned.
Requiring the return of storage charges paid for periods of time
80. Id. at 1290.
81. See supra note 70.
82. 390 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1968), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, In re Cheyenne Wells Elevator
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Colo. 1967).
83. The CCC invoked J 17(d) of the Uniform Grain Storage Agreement wich stated in
relevant part: "In the event of any disposition of the grain contrary to the terms of this agreement,
no charges shall accrue for any period of time such grain is not in store and no charges of any
kind shall be payable on any quantity of the grain not loaded out .... " In re Cheyenne Wells
Elevator Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 1019.
84. Id. at 1020-21.
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after the conversion does not penalize Cheyenne Wells for it was
not entitled to the charges in the first instance."5
This holding provides strong support for the DOE's position that forcing an
insolvent oil company like WTM to disgorge illegal overcharge profits does
not constitute a penalty under section 726(a)(4), because, as in Wagner, the
debtor "was not entitled to [these illegal profits] in the first instance." There
was no entitlement because these profits were never properly part of the
debtor's estate.1
6
The above cases, of course, arose under section 57j of the former Bank-
ruptcy Act rather than section 726(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. The legis-
lative history of the new provision, however, indicates that Congress endorsed
the approach followed by the Maier and Wagner courts, Le., distinguishing
between and treating differently "penalties" that represent compensation for
actual pecuniary loss and "penalties" that do not. The House Judiciary
Committee Report which introduced the Bankruptcy Code commented on
section 726(a)(4):
Fourth distribution is to holders of fine, penalty, forfeiture, or
multiple, punitive or exemplary damage claims. These claims are
disallowed entirely under present law. They are simply subordinated
here. Paragraph (4), in combination with paragraph (2), will require
that claims for fines, penalties, and damages be divided into the
portion that is in compensation for actual pecuniary loss and the
portion that is not. Distribution under the two paragraphs will be
made accordingly."
The clear implication of this passage is that even if denominated a "penalty,"
a bankruptcy claim that represents compensation for actual pecuniary loss
(or the corresponding portion of such a claim) should be ranked with the
other general unsecured claims under section 726(a)(2). Thus, under this
approach the DOE's claim should be included in full in the section 726(a)(2)
category of claims and not subordinated under section 726(a)(4), because it
is in the exact amount of the pecuniary loss represented by the illegal
overcharges without any additional charge.
Nevertheless, because allowance of any claim on a debtor's estate by the
federal government further reduces the recovery of private creditors in the
typical liquidation, the DOE's claims predictably aroused the hostility of
private creditors and stimulated efforts by trustees to defeat them." In arguing
that the DOE's claim was for a penalty, the trustee in WTM made an
impassioned appeal that allowance of the DOE's claim without subordination
would unfairly penalize WTM's "legitimate creditors" by cutting the recovery
85. Wagner, 390 F.2d at 15 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 383 (emphasis supplied). See also 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTcY j 726.02(4) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 66.
88. The trustee has a statutory duty to combat unfounded bankruptcy claims. See supra note
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of these "real, living, suffering claimants" in half. 9 The DOE responded
that "[t]he fruits of debtor's overcharges never rightfully belonged either to
the debtor or to its creditors. There is no reason why the other creditors
should gain a windfall at the expense of the overcharge victims or profit by
the debtor's illegal gains." 9
The DOE's position is supported by a number of appellate court bankruptcy
decisions. In In re F. W. Koenecke & Sons, Inc.,9 the debtor, a cigarette
distributor, had engaged in a fraudulent licensing scheme to avoid paying the
taxes it collected for the state on the cigarettes it sold. The bankruptcy judge
subordinated the state's claim for the unpaid taxes, holding that it would be
inequitable for the state to participate on either a priority or equal basis in
distribution with other creditors. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. It
noted that all the people of the state benefitted when taxes lawfully owing
were collected, and it rejected the argument that the state was profiting at
the expense of the creditors. 92 The court categorically dismissed the notion
that allowing the state's claim would be unfair to the other creditors:
The creditors of Koenecke, of course, are not being penalized
or prosecuted in any way. Their complaints are against Koenecke
not the state. Their right to enjoy the illegal fruit of the Koenecke
scheme by usurping the unpaid State taxes resulting from the
multiple license plan can be no greater than the taxpayer's right
to avoid those taxes. 93
In another case,94 the same court applied a similar principle in holding that
the proceeds of mail fraud by a debtor are not part of its estate. Dennis
Roberts, doing business as Teltronics, Ltd. ("Teltronics"), had defrauded
thousands of consumers who responded to magazine advertisements offering
digital watches. The watches were never delivered, and Roberts absconded
with $1,300,000 of the $1,700,000 he had received in prepaid orders. He was
89. A large number of these "real, living, suffering" creditors of WTM were other oil resellers
who had themselves apparently made overcharges in violation of the Mandatory Petroleum Price
and Allocation Regulations. Based on their examination of the bankruptcy case file, DOE attorneys
calculated that 99% of WTM's indebtedness, excluding the DOE's claim, was accounted for by
other resellers. Appellant's Brief and Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 10 n.18, DOE
v. WTM, No.5-111 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
90. Brief of Appellant at 22, DOE v. WTM, No. 1-83-73K (N.D. Tex. July 26, 1984).
91. 533 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
92. The apparent basis for the lower courts' decision was not section 57j of the Bankruptcy
Act, but rather the doctrine of equitable subordination, which as the Seventh Circuit acknowledged,
gives a bankruptcy court the inherent power "under basic equitable principles" to subordinate any
claims to those of general creditors. In re F.W. Koenecke & Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d at 1024. Cf.
supra note 60.
93. In re Koenecke & Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d at 1025 (emphasis supplied). See also In re Serignese,
214 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd on the opinion of the district court sub nom.,
Goring v. United States, 330 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1964) (requiring the insolvent corporation to pay
unpaid taxes "does not unjustly punish other creditors"). In re Serignese is discussed infra at note
111.
94. In re Teltronics, Ltd., 649 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1981).
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later found guilty of fifty counts of mail fraud, 95 and a state court receiver
acting pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Prac-
tices Act froze the corporation's assets.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision refusing to order
the receiver to turn over the seized assets to the bankruptcy trustee. It stated,
"The rule that property obtained by fraud is not part of the bankrupt's
estate represents the policy that property should remain in the hands of its
rightful owners, no matter how legitimate the claims of creditors." 9 It further
declared that "[s]ince the monies were obtained by fraud, the receiver ad-
ministers monies that are not properly part of the bankrupt's estate,"' 9 and
that to add them to the estate would give its creditors "a windfall at the
expense of the defrauded customers." '
While neither is a section 726(a)(4) case, Koenecke and Teltronics plainly
indicate that the proceeds of a debtor's illegal activities are not properly part
of the estate in bankruptcy, even if they have been commingled with the
debtor's other assets. Accordingly, restoring the debtor's illegal gains to their
rightful owners does no injustice to the creditors, who have no rightful claim
to these gains. WTM's oil price overcharges deserve the same treatment as
Koenecke's converted tax revenues and Teltronics' fraudulent profits; they
should be disgorged by the estate. Such disgorgement does not "penalize"
the estate's other creditors in the sense of section 726(a)(4).
In summary, Maier and Wagner, which held that claims for restitution
similar to that of the DOE were not barred as penalties under section 57j of
the Bankruptcy Act, furnish unmistakable if somewhat obscure support for
the DOE's position that its claim for disgorgement of WTM's overcharges
should not be subordinated as a penalty pursuant to section 726(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code. This conclusion is bolstered by Koenecke's and Teltronics'
holdings that disgorgement of illegal gains in no way penalizes the debtor's
other creditors, who had no rightful claim to the illegal overcharges in the
first place and who would receive an undeserved windfall if disgorgement did
not occur. Thus, bankruptcy case law provides strong support for the DOE's
effort to block subordination of its claim as a penalty.
Does Case Law Support the Trustee's Position That the DOE's Claim
Is a Penalty Which Should Be Subordinated?
Careful research has disclosed no relevant authority concerning restitution
or disgorgement which supports the trustee's position that the DOE's claim
95. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970); In re Teltronics, Ltd., 649 F.2d at 1238.
96. In re Teltronics, Ltd., 649 F.2d at 1239 (citing In re Paragon Securities Co., 589 F.2d
1240, 1242 (3d Cir. 1978)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1241. Similarly, the TECA in WTM stated that the DOE's claim "is for funds
which were never rightfully assets of the corporatiQn." Order Denying Petition for Rehearing at
2, DOE v. W7M, No. 5-111 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. June 24, 1985). For bankruptcy decisions
involving claims of constructive trusts, see Nicklaus v. Bank of Russeilville, 336 F.2d 144, 147
(8th Cir. 1964); In re Independent Clearing House, 41 Bankr. 985, 1000 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984);
In re First Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc., 36 Bankr. 508, 511 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
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should be subordinated as a penalty. Consequently, the trustee had no
alternative but to invoke bankruptcy cases involving different kinds of claims,
such as those for taxes. 99
The trustee's most important case support came from Simonson v. Gran-
quist,'°° which involved not only a different type of bankruptcy claim from
that of the DOE (i.e., a tax penalty), but also a different, defunct statute
(section 57j of the former Bankruptcy Act).101 Justice Black's opinion for
the Supreme Court in Simonson stated that section 57j of the Bankruptcy
Act "plainly manifests a congressional purpose to bar all claims of any
kind against a bankrupt except those based on a 'pecuniary' loss. ' °102 The
WTM trustee seized upon this quotation as proof of his contention that
any bankruptcy claim which, like the DOE's claim, was not based upon
direct pecuniary loss to the holder was ipso facto a penalty which must be
barred under former section 57j and subordinated under current section
726(a)(4).10
3
Taken out of context, the above statement might appear to provide strong
support for WTM's argument. Taken in context, however, it is a dictum
which, while superficially favorable to the trustee's case, is irrelevant because
the two cases are distinguishable. The pertinent statutes'0 4 in Simonson
labeled the government claims "tax penalties,"' 0 5 and the Internal Revenue
Service's argument that the "penalty" language of section 57j applied only
to unsecured penalties but not to secured penalties was obviously strained.
0 6
In contrast, the DOE's claim against WTM was labeled "restitution" by
the statute which gave rise to it, section 209 of the ESA.' 7 Thus, the DOE
was seeking to effectuate the terminology used by Congress, while the
99. Perhaps the strongest argument the trustee could make to distinguish the four previously
discussed cases would be that, contrary to the facts in those cases, there was no guarantee that
any funds the DOE recovered from the WTM estate would in actuality reach the victims of the
illegal overcharges. However, the DOE is engaged in an ongoing and substantially successful effort
to identify and reimburse the victims of the illegal overcharges. See infra note 136.
100. 369 U.S. 38 (1962). See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
101. While an argument concerning the meaning of a current statutory provision, section
726(a)(4), based on a case construing section 57j is subject to obvious challenge, it is not as weak
as it might first seem. The Bankruptcy Code did not completely change every aspect of the former
law, and courts in Bankruptcy Code cases frequently cite pre-Code cases in support of their
holdings. Moreover, the similarity in language of the two provisions indicates that section 726(a)(4)
was modeled after section 57j, despite the important differences, and both provisions were intended
to protect innocent creditors from the debtor's wrongdoing. See supra text accompanying notes
66-72.
102. See supra text accompanying note 71.
103. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 5, DOE v. WTM, No. 1-83-73K (N.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30,
1983) ("The courts have defined penalty in functional terms and have found that a claim is for
a penalty unless it represents actual pecuniary loss to the claimant.").
104. The government's claim in Simonson was based on section 6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. In Harris v. United States, its companion case, the government's claim arose under
section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962).
105. Id.
106. The government claims in Simonson were secured claims based on perfected liens. Id.
107. ESA, at § 209. See supra note 32.
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Internal Revenue Service in Simonson was trying to read into the statutory
provision a distinction without apparent basis in the terminology Congress
had used. 08
There is a more serious flaw, however, in the trustee's argument that the
DOE's absence of pecuniary loss turns its claim against WTM into a penalty.
It necessitates rewriting the statute. Instead of barring all government pen-
alties not occasioned by pecuniary loss, section 57j under the trustee's
interpretation would bar all government claims not occasioned by pecuniary
loss and would define "penalty" in the statute as absence of any pecuniary
loss.'09 The interpretation would in effect collapse the two requirements for
barring a claim in section 57j into one: Instead of requiring (1) that a claim
be found to be a "penalty" and (2) that the claim entail an absence of
pecuniary loss before it could be barred, absence of pecuniary loss would
by itself warrant preclusion, and the "penalty" requirement would in effect
have been written out of section 57j. 1
We should hesitate to ascribe any such revisionist intention regarding
section 57j to such a champion of legislative prerogatives as Justice Black.
A more plausible interpretation of the quoted passage is that Justice Black
used the word "claims" rather loosely as a synonym for "penalties,"
perhaps to vary the style of the passage. The context is critical here. Justice
Black's purpose in Simonson was to firmly reject the Internal Revenue
Service's proffered distinction between unsecured and secured claims, as far
as penalties are concerned. It is doubtful that Justice Black intended to
suggest that the mere fact that a claimholder has suffered no pecuniary loss
automatically turns the claim into a penalty.
108. United States v. Moore, 366 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966), which the trustee also cited, is
distinguishable for the same reason. In Moore, the defendants had produced cotton in excess of
the marketing quota for their farms established under the authority of section 346(a) of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1346(a). Accordingly, they were assessed "a penalty" by
the CCC of 50% of the cotton parity price pursuant to section 1346(a). Id. at 244 n.l. When the
defendants filed bankruptcy, the bankruptcy referee rejected the government's argument that such
a section 1346(a) penalty was not a penalty under section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act. The district
court and the Fifth Circuit affirmed this finding. The Fifth Circuit, however, held that it was
error not to allow the government an opportunity to prove that part of the penalty represented
"pecuniary loss," and reversed and remanded that part of the decision. Id. at 246-47.
109. The trustee stated this position explicitly: "mhe DOE now asserts a right to recover
amounts which bear no relationship to actual pecuniary losses suffered by DOE. This circumstance
constitutes assertion of a penalty which bankruptcy law will not recognize or allow." Memorandum
re Department of Energy Claim No. 38 at 3, WTM v. DOE, No. 182-00034 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.,
filed Mar. 21, 1983). The appeal of such an interpretation of the statute to the trustee is obvious.
It would free the trustee from the need to demonstrate that the DOE's claim for "restitution"
was in fact a "penalty" and would mean that by conceding its lack of pecuniary loss, the DOE
had in effect given away its case to the trustee.
110. Such a rewriting of the statute does violence to basic principles of statutory construction.
"As in every case involving the interpretation of a statute, analysis must begin with the language
employed by Congress." Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 480 (1981). When the terms of a statute
are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in "rare and exceptional circumstances."
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978). Accord Howe v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). Absent any ambiguity in the wording of section 726(a)(4), the plain
meaning of the statute should govern. 2A Sumnmu.zAN, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSMRUcON
§§ 46.01, 46.04 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
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This interpretation and analysis of Simonson v. Granquist is consistent,
moreover, with another tax case in which the court upheld a bankruptcy
claim based upon a statutory "penalty" under the Internal Revenue Code
for failure to pay taxes, even though the debtor was not personally liable
for the taxes."' The debtor, Michael Serignese, was an officer, stockholder
and manager of Advance Caterers, Inc. ("Advance"), which filed a petition
for arrangement under chapter 11 in August, 1960. Serignese was responsible
for seeing that payroll taxes for Advance's employees were forwarded to
the Internal Revenue Service. After Serignese himself was adjudicated a
bankrupt in January, 1961, the Internal Revenue Service assessed against
him a "penalty" for the exact amount of the withholding and social security
taxes due from Advance for the last six months of 1960, which had never
been paid." 2 In reversing the referee's decision disallowing the Internal
Revenue Service claim, the district court observed that the claim, even if
labeled a "penalty," represented "the Government's actual pecuniary loss.""'
The court distinguished Simonson v. Granquist:
Simonson v. Granquist ... and In re Tom's Villa Rosa,
Inc .... are said to be authority for the proposition that penalties
are not in concert with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act and
are not allowed. However, in Simonson, the penalties involved
were penalties "on unpaid federal taxes" . . . i.e. amounts over
and above the unpaid tax. In that case the penalty was more
than the loss sustained by the non-payment. Such a penalty
punishes for delinquency. The penalty tax in the present matter
is merely to recoup the losses due to non-payment.
Similarly, in Tom's Villa Rosa, the controversy centered on a
penalty over and above the amount of the unpaid taxes. The
instant case is readily distinguishable. The penalty here does not
exact an amount over that lost by the Government in unpaid
taxes. It does not unjustly punish other creditors. Therefore, the
Court finds that the Government's claim is allowable under §
570) [sic]."
4
111. In re Serignese, 214 F. Supp. 917 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd on the opinion of the district
court sub nom., Goring v. United States, 330 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1964). Accord In re Saxe, 14
Bankr. 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
112. The IRS proceeded under section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
provided in pertinent part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed
by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay
over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax
or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or
not accounted for and paid over ....
26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1978).
113. In re Serignese, 214 F. Supp. at 919.
114. Id. at 919-20 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, the court stated in In re
Saxe, a case which squares completely with In re Serignese:
If the trustee succeeds in this application the creditors will receive a windfall to
1989]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
While tax claims and orders to disgorge funds are quite different, there
is a significant similarity in the restitutionary nature of the requirement that
Serignese make the government whole for taxes not paid because of his
nonfeasance, and the requirement that WTM disgorge illegal profits from
its overcharges. As in DOE v. WTM, the amount Serignese was required
to pay was the exact amount of the loss resulting from his actions, unlike
the tax penalty in Simonson v. Granquist. This provides further support
for rejecting subordination of the DOE's claim against WTM.
A relatively obscure case which at least superficially lends credence to the
trustee's position is In re James Butler Grocery Co. ,"s in which the New
York state government sought to enforce an agreement by a debtor grocery
to disgorge a discount or rebate it had received in violation of the New
York Agriculture and Markets Law. The court held that "the payments to
be made by the bankrupt herein were penalties within the meaning of section
57j of the Bankruptcy Act. ' " 6 Requiring forfeiture of an illegal rebate,
which forfeiture is intended to enforce minimum milk prices or a price
floor, is of course quite different from ordering restitution of illegal over-
charges, which has the opposite purpose of enforcing a price ceiling. More-
over, Butler's receipt of the rebate caused no direct pecuniary loss to anyone.
Unlike the DOE,"17 the New York Milk Control Board had no power to
require disgorgement of the rebate and only exacted Butler's agreement to
disgorge by threatening to exercise its statutory power to revoke Butler's
milk dealer's license." 8 Such a threat embodies a punitive purpose.
In re Kline,"9 another case cited by the trustee, involved sanctions levied
by the Internal Revenue Code for self-dealing with respect to tax-exempt
private foundations. 120 The "tax" imposed for violations was 5% per year
which they are not entitled. The penalty in this case is to recoup a pecuniary loss.
It does not exact an amount over that lost by the Government in unpaid taxes, and
it does not unjustly punish other creditors.
In re Saxe, 14 Bankr. at 165.
See also In re Abingdon Realty Corp., 21 Bankr. 290, 294 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (section 57j
case which upheld an I.R.S. bankruptcy claim based on a $1.8 million promissory note executed
by debtors to guarantee payment of unpaid wage taxes).
115. 22 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
116. Id. at 994.
117. The ESA authorized the federal district courts to order, and the DOE to apply for,
"restitution of moneys received in violation of any such [price control] order or regulation." See
supra note 32.
118. "The agreement to pay $2,738.43 was not a simple contract as that is ordinarily understood,
but was a payment coerced by the fear of the sovereign's power to revoke the license . . ." In re
James Butler Grocery Co., 22 F. Supp. at 994. The statute did have a separate provision,
comparable to the restitution provision of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, under which
a court might have ordered payment to producers who had been paid less than the minimum
price. See Grandview Dairy, Inc. v. Baldwin, 3d Dept., 269 N.Y.S. 116, 239 A.D. 640 (1934).
The government did not invoke this provision.
119. 403 F. Supp. 974 (D. Md. 1975), affidper curiam, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977). Accord
In re Unified Control Sys., Inc., 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978).
120. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4941, 4944).
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for each act of self-dealing and 200% if it was not corrected within a
specified period.' 2' Despite the statutory "tax" label, the court held it a
nonallowable penalty under section 57j because of the clear punitive purpose
evinced by the legislative history, which referred to these provisions as
"sanctions."'' 1 In reaching this result, moreover, the court emphasized that
the graduated levels of sanctions bore no relation to the amount of revenue
the government might have lost through such conduct as self-dealing.2' This
distinguishes such penalties from the disgorgement the DOE sought in the
exact amount of WTM's overcharges.
In summary, WTM was a case of first impression concerning the question
whether restitution of price control overcharges constitutes a "penalty"
under section 726(a)(4). Only a single obscure case - In re Maier Brewing
Co.124 - addressed the same question with respect to section 57j of the
former Bankruptcy Act. Maier supports the DOE's position that requiring
a debtor's estate to make restitution does not violate bankruptcy law.
Similarly, cases requiring the debtor to disgorge other forms of illegal
enrichment also support the DOE's position: United States v. Wagner'
25
(unearned grain storage fees); In re Teltronics, Ltd. 26 (the proceeds of a
fraudulent scheme in which those who had paid the debtor for a product
never received it); In re F. W. Koenecke & Sons, Inc. 27 (cigarette taxes
which the debtor had collected but failed to turn over to the state govern-
ment); and In re Serignese28 (payroll taxes which a corporate officer had
withheld but failed to turn over to the federal government).
121. In re Kline, 403 F. Supp. 974, 977 (D. Md. 1975), affid, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977).
122. Id. at 978 n.5.
123. In re Kline, 403 F. Supp. at 978. The Fifth Circuit followed Kline in In re Unified Control
Systems, Inc., 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978), which was on all fours with Kline. The Fifth Circuit's
reasoning resembled that of Kline: "The language of the Act, its legislative history, the graduated
levels of the sanctions imposed, and the almost confiscatory level of the exaction assessed, convince
us that the exactions in question were intended to curb the described conduct through pecuniary
punishment." Id. at 1039.
There are other decisions in which section 57j penalties have been asserted without any relation
to pecuniary loss to the government or anyone else. See, e.g., In re Caponigri, 193 F. 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1912) (government claim for forfeiture of bond by debtor bail bondsman, after accused
criminal for whom he had posted bail absconded, disallowed as a section 57j penalty); United
States v. Moore, 366 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966) ("penalty" imposed on farmers that had exceeded
cotton production allotments under the Agricultural Adjustment Act found to be section 57j
penalty); In re Flick, 5 Bankr. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (civil contempt sanctions under Pennsylvania's
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law deemed to be section 57j penalties-found
unrelated to pecuniary loss to Commonwealth or debtor's customers). See also In re Thrift Packing
Co., 100 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Tex. 1951).
124. 1 OPA Op. & Dec. 1288 (No. 37544-H, S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1944), printed in Opinions
and Decisions - Opinions of the Price Administrator and Decisions of the Federal and State Courts
on Price Control - Rent Control - Rationing (Office of Price Administration, undated).
125. 390 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1968), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, In re Cheyenne Wells Elevator
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Colo. 1967).
126. In re Teltronics, Ltd., 649 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1981).
127. 533 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
128. In re Serignese, 214 F. Supp. 917 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd on the opinion of the district
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In contrast, there appear to be no cases holding that required disgorgement
of either price control overcharges or any other form of illegal enrichment
constitutes a "penalty" under either section 726(a)(4) or section 57j. More-
over, the cases cited by the trustee in WTM are all distinguishable on both
factual and legal grounds. Simonson v. Granquist2 9 involved a statutory
tax "penalty," In re Kline'30 involved a tax penalty of up to 200% of the
amount of the violation, and In re James Butler Grocery Co.' involved
an unlawful discount or rebate - the opposite of a price control overcharge.
The clear message of the sparse bankruptcy case law on this subject is that
the DOE's claim should not be subordinated as a penalty pursuant to section
726(a)(4).
Because of the sparseness of relevant bankruptcy authority in this area,
however, it is appropriate if not required that we refer to nonbankruptcy
law to clarify the matter.13 2 Indeed, there is a considerable body of non-
bankruptcy case law concerning the question whether government claims for
disgorgement of price control overcharges under the ESA and prior statutes
constitute penalties. The balance of this article will consider this body of
nonbankruptcy "penalty" law and its bearing on resolution of the bank-
ruptcy penalty issue.
Do DOE Demands for Repayment of Price Control Overcharges
Constitute Claims for "'Restitution"?
Because of the "pecuniary loss" component of section 726(a)(4), and the
DOE's acknowledgement that it had not suffered such loss, the trustee
argued that the DOE's claim could not be other than for a penalty. M  The
DOE countered that despite the lack of pecuniary loss, its claim was for
"restitution,"' 3 4 which, as we shall see, is consistently deemed not to be a
court sub nom., Goring v. United States, 330 F.2d 960 (1964). Accord In re Saxe, 14 Bankr. 161
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
129. See supra note 71.
130. See supra note 121.
131. See supra note 115.
132. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code invites such reference, indicating that the
nature of a claim in bankruptcy depends, in the first instance, on the substantive law creating the
claim.
Legislative history states:
Bankruptcy is mainly a procedural devie, prescribing the method of accomplishing
rehabilitation or liquidation, but generally leaving undisturbed legal relationships that
existed before bankruptcy. To this end, the Bankruptcy Act incorporates State and
general Federal law in many important areas. The bankruptcy judge must apply to
the many diverse and frequently complex fact patterns that arise in the typical
bankruptcy case this general body of law...
H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADnm.
NEws 5963, 5971 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Supplement to Reply Brief of Appellee at 15, DOE v. WTM, No. 1-83-73K
(N.D. Tex., fied Dec., 1983).
134. Brief of Appellant at 1, DOE v. WTM, Civ. No. 1-83-73K (N.D. Tex., filed Sept. 8,
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"penalty."' 3 The trustee responded that the DOE's claim could not be for
restitution because the proceeds of such a claim would not go to the victims
of the overcharges, i.e., the consumers of petroleum products, but rather
into the coffers of the federal government.
13 6
Considering the question whether the DOE's claim is for restitution is
essential to determining whether it is for a "penalty." The DOE, of course,
in no way conceded that disgorged overcharges would never be returned to
the actual overcharge victims, and indeed there is strong support for the
view that the DOE has an obligation to endeavor to identify and reimburse
such victims from the disgorged funds. 3 7 Nevertheless, in view of the DOE's
concession that it had not itself suffered the overcharges,13 1 the trustee's
position that payments of overcharges to the DOE did not constitute res-
titution appears plausible at least on the surface. 39 Furthermore, because
135. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
136. Brief of Appellee at 13, DOE v. WTM, Civ. No. 1-83-73K (N.D. Tex., filed Sept. 30,
1983). The trustee's contentions are belied by the facts. In 1979, the DOE had established special
procedures to ensure that petroleum overcharges would, to the maximum extent feasible, be
returned to those who were injured thereby. On February 9, 1979, the DOE published its final
"Subpart V" regulations, 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.280-205.288 (1987). Their purpose was stated as
follows:
This Subpart establishes special procedures pursuant to which refunds may be made
to injured persons in order to remedy the effect of a violation of the regulations of
the Department of Energy. This Subpart shall be applicable in those situations in
which the Department of Energy is unable to readily identify persons who are entitled
to refunds specified in a Remedial Order, a Remedial Order for Immediate Com-
pliance, an Order of Disallowance, or a Consent Order, or to readily ascertain the
amounts that such persons are entitled to receive.
10 C.F.R. § 205.280, 44 Fed. Reg. 8,562 (1979).
For a description of Subpart V procedures, see Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington,
826 F.2d 16 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 327 (1987); RIG Cab, Inc.
v. Hodel, 797 F.2d 111, 113-15 (3d Cir. 1986).
137. The TECA has noted that "the Government has a duty to try to ascertain those overcharged,
and refund them [sic], with interest, from the restitution funds [recovered from price control
violators]." Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Edwards, 669 F.2d at 717, 723 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1982). See also Note, Collecting Overcharges from the Oil Companies: The Department
of Energy's Restitutionary Obligation, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1038 (1980) (the remedies utilized by the
DOE up to that time failed to fulfill the government's statutory obligation to make restitution to
the consumer who actually paid the overcharges).
It is difficult to perform this "duty" when, for example, this entails identifying, years afterward,
the precise victims of gasoline overcharges at a particular service station or chain of stations.
Nevertheless, it would be anomalous to conclude from this fact that those who violated the price
control laws ought to retain the fruits of their illegal actions, and the DOE has successfully argued
this in support of its claims for "restitution." See Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. O'Leary,
499 F. Supp. 871, 885-86, aff'd as modified sub nom. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v.
Edwards, 669 F.2d 717 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982).
138. See supra text accompanying note 73.
139. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and
joined by Justices Frankfurter and Reed, stated that restitution "contemplates return of the unjustly
taken enrichment to him from whom it was taken." Id. at 406. WVsEmR's TIMRD NEW INMn-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY defines restitution as:
(1) an act of restoring or a condition of being restored ... restoration of something
to its rightful owner: the making good of or giving an equivalent for some injury
1989]
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no one denied that WTM had committed illegal acts (the trustee disclaimed
any knowledge whether WTM actually had violated the price control re-
gulations), taking the offensive to refute the DOE's restitution argument
was the best and probably the only strategy the trustee could adopt in
seeking to defeat the DOE's claim.
In order to resolve the restitution question, it is necessary to examine
whether the DOE's claim can accurately be characterized as restitution under
the prevailing energy law statutes and cases. 40 As noted above, in pursuing
refunds from WTM, the DOE was proceeding pursuant to authority con-
ferred on it by section 209 of the ESA, which authorizes the federal
government to seek, and the courts to grant, temporary restraining orders
and preliminary and permanent injunctions to enforce the price control
regulations.1 41 Section 209 further provides, "In addition to such injunctive
relief, the court may also order restitution of moneys received in violation
of any such order or regulation .... ,,142
It was pursuant to this authority that the DOE issued the PRO demanding
that WTM disgorge the fruits of its violation of the price control regula-
tions. 43 As noted above, moreover, the legislative history of section 209
indicates that the explicit reference to restitution was included to remove
any doubt that "there was an inherent equitable power in the court to set
things right and order restitution.' 44
(as a loss of or damage to property) ... (2) something intended to cause or serving
to cause restoration of a previous state ... an action based upon equitable principles
to recover money or property that in good conscience belongs to the plaintiff or to
prevent a defendant from being unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff
140. The trustee in W7M questioned the relevance of nonbankruptcy cases cited by the DOE.
See Brief of Appellee at 15, DOE v. WTM, Civ. No. 1-83-73K (Bankr. N.D. Tex., filed Sept.
30, 1983) (footnote omitted). Yet the trustee himself cited'nonbankruptcy cases when they supported
his arguments. In any event, the propriety of invoking nonbankruptcy substantive law in deciding
issues under the Bankruptcy Code is clear. Despite its unique features, the Bankruptcy Code was
never intended to function as an autonomous legal system, divorced from other areas of substantive
law. To the contrary, it was intended to incorporate these areas of law. See supra note 132.
141. See supra note 32.
142. ESA, § 209, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969). Words chosen by Congress to describe delegated
authority are ordinarily to be accorded their "plain meaning," and thus such labels constitute one
factor to consider in deciding whether a claim is punitive. Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v.
Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 237 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); United States v. New
England Coal & Coke Co., 318 F.2d 138, 144 (1st Cir. 1963). Accordingly, Congress' use of the
term "restitution" in section 209 should be deemed intentional, thereby reinforcing the argument
that such claims cannot be considered penalties.
143. The DOE maintained throughout the case that it was proceeding pursuant to the authority
conferred by section 209 of the ESA. The TECA maintained that the DOE "did not assert its
claim pursuant to Section 209 of the ESA," which authorizes courts to order restitution but
"confers no authority on the DOE to seek overcharges directly from violators." WTM, 763 F.2d
at 1414-15 n.4. A PRO, while seeking voluntary compliance by the company involved, obviously
contemplates litigation if such compliance is not forthcoming. Thus, this conclusion by the TECA
seems an illogical quibble, which is contradicted by the later statement in the decision ("On
Petition for Rehearing Per Curiam") that "the DOE sought restitution [from WTMJ under the
authority of § 209 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1973 .... " Id. at 1426.
144. See supra note 33. The need for spelling out explicitly the court's equitable restitutionary
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Restitution was obviously an extremely sensitive subject for price control
violators because it meant not merely foregoing future profits but disgorging
significant sums already received. 145 As with the Office of Price Adminis-
tration cases of the 1940s,' 46 violators made every possible challenge to the
authority of the agency to seek or order restitution. The TECA 47 uniformly
rejected these challenges, confirming that the district courts in price control
cases retained the broad power and flexibility of traditional equity courts
to combat unjust enrichment by ordering disgorgement of illegal gains. 48
The court in United States v. Lieb149 held constitutional the ESA, Exec-
utive Order 11615 empowering the Cost of Living Council to implement the
ESA, and the price control regulations issued by the Cost of Living Council.5 0
The court further enjoined the defendant landlord from charging rents in
excess of the permissible ceiling amounts and ordered him to make restitution
power may have been suggested to the draftsmen of the ESA by the history of the World War
II price controls. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 contained no explicit restitutionary
authority. Therefore, those accused of price control violations vigorously denied that the Office
of Price Administration possessed the authority to seek, and the courts the power to grant,
restitution of overcharges. The issue was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-401 (1946). In Porter, the Court held that federal courts
had the authority under section 205(a) of the 1942 Act to order restitution in exercise of the
traditional equitable power of the courts. Id. The draftsmen of the ESA probably had in mind
the 1942 Act, the only previous federal price control statute, and desired to avoid the need for a
reprise of Porter.
145. See supra note 8.
146. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321, 330 (1944); Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1945). See infra text accompanying
notes 173-85.
147. Section 211(b)(2) of the ESA gave the TECA (which was modeled after the Emergency
Court of Appeals created to adjudicate price control cases during World War II) exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of all cases arising under the ESA. Section 5(a)(l) of the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act adopted section 211 of the ESA and gave the TECA jurisdiction over all cases
arising under regulations promulgated pursuant to the ESA and actions taken by the President
and Secretary of Energy under the ESA. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(1) (1974). The Supreme Court has
stated:
Congress created the TECA and vested it with "exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals
from the district courts of the United States in cases and controversies arising under
this title or under regulations or orders issued thereunder." This judicial-review
provision was designed to provide speedy resolution of cases brought under the Act
and "to funnel into one court all the appeals arising out of the District Courts and
thus gain in consistency of decision." The provision thus carved out a limited
exception to the broad jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over "appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States."
Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 74 (1975) (citations omitted).
Another closely related purpose for establishing the TECA was, of course, to insure consistent
adjudication of ESA issues nationwide. Id.; Lea Exploration, Inc. v. DOE, 843 F.2d 510 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1988).
148. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
149. 333 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 1161 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972).
150. 333 F. Supp. at 429. The constitutionality of the ESA was also upheld in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971).
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of overcharges already received.' The TECA affirmed this decision, 152 as
well as a contemporaneous decision ordering the University of Southern
California to refund excess charges for football tickets.5 3 In the latter case,
the TECA held, "we find the power to demand a refund properly at the
appellant's disposal.'
15 4
While these cases established the power of a court to order restitution
upon the agency's application, the plaintiff in Bonray Oil Co. v. DOE",
argued that the agency'5 6 lacked power to order a refund of overcharges
without going to court. In rejecting this claim, the district court observed
that regulations authorizing the Federal Energy Administration (the "FEA")
to issue remedial orders requiring refunds of overcharges had been in effect
throughout the period during which Congress, on four separate occasions,
had extended the agency's regulatory authority under the Emergency Petro-
leum Allocation Act.157 Moreover, a Congressional committee report on the
statute indicated that Congress was familiar with the Cost of Living Coun-
cil's Petroleum Price Regulations and approved of them.' 5' The court stated
that requiring refunds of overcharges was "certainly a rational method of
accomplishing" goal (f) of the EPAA, which was to achieve equitable pricing
and distribution of crude oil and petroleum products 5 9 It concluded "that
the FEA did not exceed its statutory authority in ordering refunds on
overcharges in the Remedial Order presently challenged by plaintiff Bon-
ray.'" 16 The TECA affirmed the district court decision without modifica-
tion.' 6'
In Sauder v. DOE, 62 the TECA upheld the DOE's position that an
individual who managed an oil field in which he had a partial ownership
interest was liable for restitution of the illegal profits from the entire oil
field and not merely his own proportional share of such profits. Earl Sauder
was the driving force and largest investor in a group of six persons who
together purchased all nine oil leases covering a crude oil reservoir in Kansas
151. 333 F. Supp. at 429.
152. 462 F.2d 1161 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1972).
153. University of Southern Cal. v. Cost of Living Council, 472 F.2d 1065 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
154. Id. at 1070.
155. 472 F. Supp. 899, 903 (W.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 601 F.2d 1191 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1979). See supra note 22.
156. The original defendant was the Federal Energy Administration, but the DOE was created
as the FEA's successor by Congress while the case was pending and was substituted as defendant.
Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375.
157. 472 F. Supp. at 903.
158. H.R. REP. No. 628, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1973), cited in Bonray Oil Co., 472 F. Supp.
899 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
159. Goal (t) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was "equitable distribution of crude
oil, residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products at equitable prices among all regions and
areas of the United States and sectors of the petroleum industry. .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 753 (b)(1)(F)
(1976).
160. 472 F. Supp. at 904.
161. 601 F.2d 1191 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).
162. 648 F.2d 1341 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981).
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and consolidated them into three leases. 61 When the group sold the oil to
Mobil Oil Corporation ("Mobil"), Sauder certified that it was exempt from
price controls under the "stripper well" exemption.'6 The DOE, disagreeing
that the oil was "stripper" production, issued a Notice of Probable Violation
and later a Remedial Order which was upheld when Sauder challenged it in
federal district court. 6 The court ordered Sauder to make restitution of
the entire oil field's illegal profits resulting from his incorrect certification
to Mobil.
On appeal, the TECA rejected Sauder's arguments that the regulations
were illegal and that the field qualified for the "stripper well" exemption.
In response to Sauder's final argument that section 209 of the ESA did not
permit the court or the agency to order a violator of the regulations to
refund moneys he had not actually received, the TECA stated that sectibn
209 did not purport to limit the courts' power to "a particularly strict
interpretation of restitution."'' 6 Rather, the TECA adopted the following
expansive definition from the Restatement of Restitution: "In equity, res-
titution is usually thought of as a remedy by which defendant is made to
disgorge ill gotten gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish both
objectives." 1 67 Sauder, of course, had not been personally enriched by that
portion of the illegal profits from the field which went to his coinvestors.
The court reasoned, however, that because it would be burdensome for the
agency to seek refunds from each property owner, because this would divert
the agency's energies from its enforcement effort, and because Sauder had
caused the overcharges in the first place through his incorrect certifications,
it was not unfair to shift that burden to him.1 68
163. This aging oil field, which had been exploited since the 1920s, was no longer in the
"primary production" state, and special "secondary recovery operations" were necessary to extract
the oil. It was advantageous to combine leases covering adjacent tracts so that such operations
could be conducted without regard to surface property lines. While Sauder owned 33% of one
lease, 41% of the second and evidently no part of the third, the other investors agreed that he
should be the sole operator of the leases. Id. at 1347.
164. To encourage maximum production of oil from marginal properties with proportionally
high overhead costs, Congress exempted oil wells which produced less than an average of ten
gallons of oil per well per day ("stripper wells") from the price ceilings from 1973 until 1981,
with a brief hiatus in 1975.
165. In a sense, Sauder lost the case by failing to comply with a technical procedural requirement.
There was no dispute that formal "unitization" of the property would have made it eligible for
the stripper well exemption, but Sauder and the other lease owners had never concluded a formal
unitization agreement for the three leases despite the fact that they had been operated as a single
unit since 1966.
166. 648 F.2d at 1347. Accord United States v. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d 1240, 1279 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986) reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986).
167. RESTATm.NT OF RzsnrunoN § 1, comment e (1937), quoted in 648 F.2d at 1348 (emphasis
added by TECA). Accord United States v. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d at 1278; Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 327 (1987). In applying this definition to W77i of course, "restitution" would be achieved
if WTM merely disgorged its illegal gains, regardless whether the funds were actually returned to
the overcharge victims.
168. 648 F.2d at 1347-48. Accord United States v. Exxon, 773 F.2d at 1269-70; Citronelle-
Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987).
19891
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The TECA again quoted the Restatement of Restitution in Citronelle-
Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Edwards,69 when it ordered restitution of illegal
profits from a trade scheme involving sham "export sales" of oil designed
to evade the price control regulations. The court noted that restitution was
intended to enforce compliance with the regulatory scheme. 70 Accordingly,
the central purpose of restitution is to determine the amount by which the
wrongdoer has been unjustly enriched, and to make him disgorge that
amount. No proof is required that the plaintiff was damaged, much less
the amount of damage:
Restitution is generally awarded only in order to deprive the
defendant of enrichment obtained at the plaintiff's expense ...
[The general requirement does not mean that the gain to the
defendant need be equated to the loss of the plaintiff, nor indeed
that there be by any loss to the plaintiff except in-the sense that
a legally protected interest has been invaded.'
7'
In accordance with this definition, the DOE was plainly seeking restitution
in WTM despite its acknowledgement that it had not itself suffered any
pecuniary loss. 72 Thus, the settled law of the TECA, the court with exclusive
jurisdiction over issues arising under the ESA, is that the DOE has statutory
authority to seek restitution and that claims like the DOE's against WTM
are for restitution, even if the DOE has not suffered pecuniary loss.
The TECA's position concerning restitution of price control overcharges,
moreover, is consistent with case law construing the Office of Price Ad-
ministration's power to enforce the price control scheme instituted by the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,71 the lineal ancestor of the ESA.
74
Like the ESA and the federal antitrust statutes, the 1942 Act provided for
a two-track process of enforcement of price controls: by private legal actions
for damages by the overcharged individual' 75 and by equitable actions
brought by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration.
76
169. 669 F.2d 717 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982).
170. Id. at 721-22. Accord RJG Cab, Inc. v. Hodel, 797 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986).
171. REsTATEmENT oF REsarSTIoN § 1, comment e (1937), quoted in Citronelle-Mobile Gathering
Inc., 669 F.2d at 722. Accord United States v. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d at 1286; United States v.
Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1061 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987);
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 29 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987).
See also Note, Refunding Overcharges Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act: The
Evolution of a Compensatory Obligation, 79 MtCm. L. REV. 1454, 1462 (1981).
172. Other cases holding that the DOE's claims for disgorgement of overcharges constitute
restitution include Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co. v. DOE, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 26,400 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 30, 1982); Getty Oil Co. v. DOE, 569 F. Supp. 1204, 1217-18 (D. Del. 1983); Prosper
Energy v. DOE, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) J 26,438, 29,262-63 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 1983); In re
Stripper Well Litigation, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 26,445, 29,304, 29,310-11 (D. Kan. Sept. 13,
1983). Similarly, although the National Labor Relations Board had not itself suffered any pecuniary
loss, the Supreme Court found it was an appropriate "creditor" in a bankruptcy case to collect
from a debtor's estate back pay in compensation for unfair labor practices by the debtor against
its employees. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952).
173. Formerly, 50 U.S.C. § 925 (the "1942 Act").
174. See supra note 32.
175. Section 205(e). This section also authorized the injured party to sue for up to three times
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Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,'7 the administrator sued a Minneapolis
landlord company, alleging that it had charged rents in excess of the legal
maximums under the 1942 Act and seeking a decree requiring the defendant
to tender refunds to the overcharged tenants. While enjoining defendant from
continuing to overcharge its tenants, the district court held that it lacked
jurisdiction under the statute to order restitution of the overcharges 7 and
the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 179 This decision squarely conflicted with the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Bowles v. Skaggs,80 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve this conflict.
Because the 1942 Act did not explicitly authorize restitution, a key question
on appeal was whether a restitution order constituted the kind of "other
order" which section 205(a) authorized courts to issue in enforcement of the
statute.' In Hecht Co. v. Bowles,182 a case decided just prior to Warner
Holding Co., the Supreme Court vigorously reaffirmed the traditional equi-
table powers of the federal courts and endorsed the flexibility they traditionally
had to mold decrees to meet the individual needs of a particular case. In
Warner Holding Co., the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that
federal trial courts did have authority under the statute to order restitution,
because "[ain order for the recovery and restitution of illegal rents may be
considered a proper 'other order' on either of two theories ... 1."I'3
Thus, despite the lack of an explicit reference to restitution in the statute,
the Supreme Court squarely concluded in Warner Holding Co. that the Office
of Price Administration, the agency entrusted with enforcement of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942, had power and authority to seek restitution
of overcharges in violation of the price control regulations. The ESA, the
direct descendant of the 1942 Act, explicitly authorizes the government agency
to seek restitution. The settled law of the TECA, the court with exclusive
jurisdiction over ESA cases, is that claims like the DOE's against WTM
constitute claims for restitution despite the lack of pecuniary loss to the
DOE. '8 Warner Holding Co. provides persuasive additional support for the
correctness of the TECA's holdings. 85
the amount of the overcharge. If the injured party failed to sue, the Administrator could bring
an action in his stead.
176. Section 205(a). See supra note 32 for text of section 205(a).
177. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
178. 60 F. Supp. 513 (D. Minn. 1944).
179. 151 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1945).
180. 151 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1945).
181. See supra note 32.
182. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
183. 328 U.S. at 399. Accord Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 290-91 (1960)
(court had power to order reimbursement of back wages to employees who had been discriminatorily
fired in violation of section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938).
184. See supra text accompanying note 172.
185. The holding in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., that the regulatory agency had authority
under the statute to seek restitution, applies with special force to the DOE's enforcement efforts
under section 209 of the ESA, the text of which is largely identical to section 205(a) of the 1942
Act. See supra note 32. When provisions of two statutes contain virtually identical language and
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Applying the above principles to DOE v. WTM, the DOE's claim is clearly
for restitution. "The central purpose of restitution is to determine the amount
by which [WTM] has been unjustly enriched, and then to make [WTM]
disgorge the amount," and "[n]o proof is required that [the DOE] was
damaged .... 11,86 Furthermore, according to Professor Moore's definition
of restitution, which the TECA has adopted, restitution occurs when the
defendant merely "disgorge[s] ill-gotten gains," whether or not the defendant
also "restore[s] the status quo,"'17 i.e., makes refunds to the precise indivi-
duals overcharged as the result of the price control violations in the precise
amount they were overcharged. 88 Thus, despite the initial plausibility of the
trustee's argument that restitution could not be made through payments to
the DOE, a nonvictim of the price control overcharges, a solid wail of judicial
precedent indicates that the TECA properly rejected this argument and that
the DOE's claim was indeed for restitution.
Do DOE Demands for Repayment of Price Control Overcharges Fit the
Legal Definition of a "Penalty" in Price Control Overcharge Cases?
As indicated above,8 9 the issue whether the DOE's claim in WTM should
be subordinated pursuant to section 726(a) boils down to the question whether
the claim constitutes a "penalty." Once the DOE's claim is deemed a claim
for "restitution," subordination is easy to avoid, because it is settled law that
restitution is not a penalty. Even if the restitution characterization is put
aside, however, there is strong authority in the case law that government
efforts to force price control violators to disgorge their illegal profits do not
constitute the imposition of "penalties."
The TECA's conclusion in WTM that the DOE was not seeking a penalty
was based on neither of these propositions. Rather, the TECA simply stated:
The DOE's claim is clearly for restitution and not for a penalty.
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq., has specific sections which deal with civil
the first statute is the source of a provision in the second, the Supreme Court has inferred
legislative intent that the second provision be given the same construction as the provision on
which it is modeled. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
186. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc., 669 F.2d at 722.
187. 5 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & J. WicKER, MooPn's FEDERAL PRAcnrcE 38.24[2] (2d ed. 1948),
quoted in Sauder, 648 F.2d at 1348.
188. Contra United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1956). In Parkinson, the
court affirmed the lower court's refusal to order that "restitution" be made by defendants to the
United States Treasury Department for the offense of selling in interstate commerce misbranded
drugs promising to cure male impotence, holding that the court had no statutory authority, either
express or implied, to grant such equitable relief, and that it should not do so in the absence of
statutory authority. This case is clearly distinguishable from DOE v. WTM, because, as noted
supra at note 7, section 209 of the ESA authorized courts to order "restitution" of profits resulting
from violation of price control regulations promulgated pursuant to the ESA.
189. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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and criminal penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(3). The DOE did
not seek these penalties. Instead, the DOE sought restitution under
the authority of § 209 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,
12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, as incorporated in the Emergency Petro-
leum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(1)
.... It is manifest that whatever its amount is, DOE's claim is
not one for "any fine, penalty or forfeiture, or for multiple or
exemplary, or punitive damages," and thus cannot lawfully be
relegated to the fourth priority [under § 726(a)(4)].190
This conclusory passage (1) appears to assume a distinction between "resti-
tution" and "penalty," implying that a claim cannot be both at the same
time, and (2) seems to impart excessive significance to such statutory labels
as "penalty," as if such a label conclusively characterized that to which it
referred. Because neither proposition is self-evident, and no support for either
is provided by the above passage, the balance of this article will assess the
validity of the propositions by referring to authority omitted from the TECA's
opinion.
The second proposition, which the DOE duly argued in DOE v. WTM,
can be briefly addressed at the outset. This argument focuses not on the
essence of the DOE's claim against WTM for disgorgement of overcharges
(as "restitution" vel non, and as "penalty" vel non), but rather on its
placement in the statutory and regulatory scheme, in contradistinction to the
location of the provisions for "penalties." The argument may be stated as
follows: section 209 of the ESA specifically authorizes the DOE to seek
restitution, and the DOE sought restitution under this authority in WTM.'91
Section 5(a)(3) of the EPAA,192 which replaced the original penalty provisions
of section 208 of the ESA,' 93 authorizes the government to seek up to $20,000
in "civil penalt[ies]' 94 for each violation of the regulations, imprisonment
for a period of up to one year and fines of $40,000 for willful violations. 95
These provisions are not a dead letter. The DOE has sought such penalties
in numerous cases, and courts have granted them on occasion.'9 Moreover,
in approving the DOE's claim for restitution of price control overcharges but
denying its request for penalties, courts have implied that the two are different
and that restitution cannot be regarded as a penalty. 97 In WTM, the DOE
190. DOE v. WVTM, 763 F.2d 1411, 1426 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App., 1985). See also supra note
26.
191. See supra note 142.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(3) (1976).
193. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(3)(A)(i) (1976).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(3)(B)(i) (1976).
196. See United States v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 638 F.2d 239 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981); United States v. Heller, 635 F.2d 848 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App,
1980), on remand, 542 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1981); United States v. Cohen, 380 F. Supp. 147
(S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd on the opinion of the district court, 501 F.2d 1407 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1974).
197. The court in United States v. Sutton, No. 82-C-1069-B, slip op. at I (N.D. Okla. 1984),
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sought restitution under section 209 and voluntarily declined to seek any
penalties under section 5(a)(3). 191 Accordingly, the restitution the DOE sought
from WTM cannot be a penalty.
This argument has force. Courts should give some deference to what
Congress thought it was authorizing, as reflected in labels like "penalty" and
"restitution" attached to statutory provisions. 199 Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has given deference to quite similar arguments in answering
the related question whether a statutory penalty is "criminal" or "civil." In
Helvering v. Mitchell,2 0 the defendant taxpayer, who had been indicted and
acquitted of willful tax evasion, challenged a 50% addition to his tax liability
for "fraud" as a criminal penalty which violated the double jeopardy clause.
2
0
1
Justice Brandeis, for the Court, rejected this argument and concluded that
the 50% addition was a "civil" penalty:2
4. The fact that the Revenue Act of 1928 contains two separate
and distinct provisions imposing sanctions, and that these appear
in different parts of the statute, helps to make clear the character
of that here invoked. The sanction of fine and imprisonment
prescribed by § 146 (b) for wilfull [sic] attempts "in any manner
to evade or defeat any [income] tax", introduced into the Act
aff'd, 795 F.2d 1040, 1061 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986), decreed that defendants remit more
than $423 million to the United States Treasury "as restitution and not as a penalty." Other cases
in which courts ordered restitution for price control overcharges but declined to impose civil
penalties include Shrider v. DOE, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 26,273 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Sauder v.
DOE, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 1 26,157 (D. Kan. 1980), affd, 648 F.2d 1341 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1981); Whitmer v. DOE, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 26,358 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Citronelle-
Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. O'Leary, 499 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Ala. 1980); United States v. Exxon
Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 773 F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986).
198. Appellant's Brief and Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 11, DOE v. VTM,
763 F.2d 1411 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). The DOE also did not invoke against WVTM
regulatory provisions which authorized penalties for violations of DOE's regulations and orders.
199. The Supreme Court has stated, "Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, [the language of the statute itself] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer
Product Safety Conmn'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). See also Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169-71 (1963); United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304 (1924);
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Le Beouf
Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977). See also supra
note 110.
In contrast, when considering whether a federal excise tax was a disallowable "penalty" under
section 57j of the former Bankruptcy Act, the Fifth Circuit stated: "We cannot agree with the
suggestion that the label placed upon an imposition in a revenue measure is decisive in determining
its character. Like all other language in statutes, its meaning depends more upon its context than
on its etymology." In re Unified Control Systems, Inc., 586 F.2d 1036, 1037 (5th Cir. 1978)
(citations omitted).
200. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
201. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, cI. 2.
202. It is not a violation of the double jeopardy clause for the government to bring a civil
action against a defendant previously acquitted of a criminal charge. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 397 (1938); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943).
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under the heading "Penalties", is obviously a criminal one. The
sanction of 50 per centum addition "if any part of any deficiency
is due to fraud with intent to evade tax", prescribed by § 293 (b),
introduced into the Act under the heading "Additions to the Tax",
was clearly intended as a civil one .... 203
By the same token, a strong argument can be made that restitution pursuant
to section 209 ought not to be deemed a penalty, because Congress explicitly
provided for penalties elsewhere in the same general statutory scheme.2
While this argument based on statutory language and construction is per-
suasive, it would not be conclusive if relevant substantive law indicated a
contrary result. Accordingly, we must pass to a substantive consideration of
whether disgorgement of price control overcharges constitutes a penalty, and
this question is not a simple one. It is difficult to define "penalty" in the
abstract. As a leading treatise states, "[a] satisfactory and clear-cut formula
to separate penalties from non-penalties has not yet been agreed upon by the
courts."m'' 5 In the absence of such a formula, the first place to look for
clarification is obviously the case law construing the statutory term. DOE v.
WTM was a case of first impression, i.e., no prior case had decided whether
price control overcharges constitute "penalties" under section 726(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, nonbankruptcy cases addressing the question
whether the DOE claims for disgorgement of price control overcharges con-
stitute "penalties" will be examined.20
Authority for the proposition that restitution of price control overcharges
does not constitute a "penalty" is overwhelming and unequivocal. In up-
holding the authority of federal courts to order restitution of overcharges for
violation of the price ceilings under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
the Sixth Circuit stated: "An order of restitution is not a judgement for
damages or for penalties. It compels compliance and is restoration of the
status quo which falls within the recognized power of a court of equity."'
203. 303 U.S. at 404-05 (emphasis supplied). See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,
250 (1980). Accord One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 231,
236-37 (1972); Porter v. Household Fin. Corp. of Columbus, 385 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
204. Section 5(a)(3) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act. Similarly, the captions of the
ESA's sections support this distinction between their respective substantive contents. Section 208
of the ESA is entitled "Sanctions; criminal fine and civil penalty." Section 209 is captioned
"Injunctions and other relief," while section 210, which authorizes private actions for treble
damages, is entitled "Suits for damages or other relief." 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969), adopted
by § 5(a) of the EPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1976).
205. 3 Cor. nm oN BANKRupTcY 57.2212], at 387 (14th ed. 1975). Accord In re Kline, 403 F.
Supp. 974, 977 (D. Md. 1975).
206. This discussion is undertaken in full recognition that it is risky to transfer concepts and
definitions wholesale from one legal context to another, and that "[w]hat is considered a penalty
differs with circumstances and viewpoints." National Brass Works, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 182 F.2d 526, 529 n.9 (9th Cir. 1950) (listing four categories of federal statutory "penalty"
questions).
207. Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 1945). Accord Woods v. Witzke, 174 F.2d
855, 856-57 (6th Cir. 1949). It is also settled that "the bankruptcy court in passing on allowance
of claims sits as a court of equity." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939). In addition,
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Shortly afterward, the Supreme Court in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,201
endorsed this view, sharply distinguishing restitution from penalties:
Restitution, which lies within that equitable jurisdiction, is con-
sistent with and differs greatly from the damages and penalties
which may be awarded under § 205(e). When the Administrator
[of the Office of Price Administration] seeks 'restitution under §
205(a) he does not request the court to award statutory damages
to the purchaser or tenant or to pay to such person that part of
the penalties which go to the United States Treasury in a suit by
the Administrator under § 205(e) ....
While ignoring Porter v. Warner Holding Co., the trustee in bankruptcy
for WTM cited two Office of Price Administration cases in which the courts
held that government claims for treble damages under section 205(e) of the
1942 Act constituted penalties. 210 The WTM case, however, was brought under
"[t]here is an overriding consideration that equitable considerations govern the exercise of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction." Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966). Accord In re Seminole
Backhoe Serv., Inc., 33 Bankr. 914 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (Brister, J.). Because an order of
restitution is an equitable remedy, allowance of a claim for restitution by a bankruptcy court
seems consistent with the equitable authority and purposes of a bankruptcy court. To argue
otherwise, one would have to assume that equitable principles in bankruptcy differ from equitable
principles applicable in other contexts.
208. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
209. Id. at 402 (citation omitted). The Emergency Price Control Act was amended in 1947 to
expressly codify the holding in Porter v. Warner Holding Co. and to authorize the federal
government to bring actions for restitution of rent overcharges. See supra note 32. Even though
they were filed by the federal government on behalf of the injured tenants, government claims
brought under the 1947 rent control amendment were uniformly held not to be penalties. Howard
v. United States, 214 F.2d 759, 762 (10th Cir. 1954) (claim for restitution under 1947 amendment
is an equitable claim which confers no seventh amendment right to a jury trial-unlike a treble
damage claim under the same statute, which is for a penalty and does entail a right to jury trial).
Accord Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (Court upholding equitable power of
district court to order reimbursement of lost wages to employees wrongfully discharged in violation
of section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v. Cowen's Estate, 91 F. Supp.
331, 332 (D. Mas's. 1950); United States v. Harris, 89 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (claim for
restitution under 1947 alnendment does not abate on death of defendant, unlike treble damage
claim under the statute, which does abate because it is a "penalty" claim). See also United States
v. Stinmett, III F. Supp. 384, 385, 387 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
210. Bowles v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 147 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1945); Porter v. Montgomery, 163
F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1947). Likewise, in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), the Court stated: "[flor
the purposes of this case, we assume, without deciding, that § 205(e) is a penal statute in the
'public international,' 'private international,' or any other sense." Id. at 389. Contra Woods v.
Robb, 171 F.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1948); Kessler v. Fleming, 163 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1947);
Martino v. Holzworth, 158 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1947); Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719, 722 (10th
Cir. 1946); Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1946); Speten v. Bowles, 146 F.2d
602, 604-05 (8th Cir. 1945); Bowles v. American Stores, 139 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Bowles v. Berard, 57 F. Supp. 94, 95-96 (E.D. Wis. 1944); Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787,
790 (N.D. Cal. 1944). See also Murfkan v. Kahn, 11 F.R.D. 520, 521 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Accord
United States v. Harris, 89 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of
Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957). The most comprehensive listing of the many Office of Price
Administration cases deciding whether claims for treble damages under section 205(e) of the
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section 209 of the ESA, the lineal descendant of section 205(a) of the 1942
Act. As the Supreme Court noted in the above quotation from Warner, actions
under section 205(a) of the 1942 Act (e.g., for restitution) have nothing to do
with actions for damages or penalties under section 205(e):211 similarly, section
205(e) penalty holdings are irrelevant to section 209 ESA cases.
212
The author is unaware of a single case holding that court-ordered restitution
under section 205(a) of the 1942 Act constitutes a penalty. Restitution of the
exact amount of overcharges, which seems only fair when the overcharging
party has profited from violating the law, contrasts sharply with treble dam-
ages, which are undoubtedly punitive or penal .21  Nevertheless, as indicated
above, the majority of courts of appeals have held that even treble damages
claims under section 205(e) are not penalties: a fortiori, claims for mere
restitution of the exact amount of overcharges clearly should not be considered
penalties.
The decisions under the Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations are even
more uniform in holding that the DOE claims for disgorgement of overcharges
do not constitute penalties. In Ashland Oil Co. of California v. Union Oil
Co. of California,2 1 4 Ashland brought an action against Union for damages
under section 210 of the ESA,2 5 seeking both recovery of actual overcharges
and treble damages for "intentional" overpricing. Because neither the EPAA
nor the ESA contained a statute of limitations, the trial court "borrowed"
the most analogous California statute of limitations.21 6 It dismissed the entire
action as tardily filed under the state's one-year statute for "[a]n action upon
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 constituted "penalties" may be found in Oglebay, Provability
and Dischargeability of Judgments Against Overcharging Merchants and Landlords Under Emer-
gency Price Control Act, 21 J. NAT'L A. OF REFEREES n B . 39, 40-43 (Jan. 1947), with
sequels in the July, 1947 edition at 105-06, and in the January, 1948 edition at 44-45. See also
Hatton, State Court Jurisdiction of Federal Rights of Action-Emergency Price Control Act, 40
In. L. Ra,. 355, 359-64 (1946).
211. Other courts which noted the sharp distinction between equitable section 205(a) actions for
restitution and section 205(e) actions for treble damages include Creedon v. Randolph, 165 F.2d
918, 919-20 (5th Cir. 1948); Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410, 413 (8th Cir. 1946); United States v.
Hart, 86 F. Supp. 787, 788-89 (E.D. Va. 1949). In the analogous context of antitrust treble
damages, it has been stated that "[t]he damage is payable under §726(a)(2), while the remainder
[twice the damage claim] is payable under 726(a)(4)." 4 CouLE oN B.AxRusTrcy, 726.02[4], at
726-67 (L. King 15th ed. 1986). Accord In re American Federation of Television & Radio Artists,
32 Bankr. 672, 674 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983).
212. Further support for the sharp distinction between section 205(a) and section 205(e) actions
is found in the fact that nine months after Farmers National Bank was decided by the Sixth
Circuit, the same court squarely held that an action for restitution under section 205(a) of the
1942 Act did not constitute a penalty. Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F.2d at 820-21. Accord Woods v.
Witzke, 174 F.2d 855, 856-57 (6th Cir. 1949).
213. The court in Farmers National Bank stated that if a sum of money exacted for violation
of a statute "is greatly disproportionate to the actual loss it constitutes a penalty rather than
damages." 147 F.2d at 428 (footnote omitted).
214. 567 F.2d 984 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978).
215. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1969), incorporated in § 5(a)(1) of the EPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 754
(a)(1) (1976).
216. 567 F.2d at 989. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179-80 (1976); Auto Workers
v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-05 (1966).
1989]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
422 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
a statute for a penalty or forfeiture," 217 in effect holding that Ashland's claims
were for penalties. On appeal, the TECA agreed that the treble damages claim
was "in the nature of a penalty" and thus barred.218 The court reached the
opposite result, however, with regard to mere overcharges. It held: "An action
for compensation logically is not '[a]n action upon a statute for penalty or
forfeiture' ... [I]t would be especially unreasonable to bar gratuitously an
action for reimbursement of overcharges on the basis of the one year statute
of limitations. ' 21 9 In addition, the TECA rejected defendant Union's conten-
tion that the entire ESA was a penal statute. 0
Subsequently, the district court in Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v.
O'Leary' rejected a claim that restitution of overcharges which it ordered
made to the United States Treasury constituted a penalty. In reaching this
conclusion, the court applied an almost century-old test for determining a
"penalty." The test is derived from Huntington v. Attrill,m and is based on
Blackstone's distinction between "private wrongs" and "public wrongs." '
According to this test, a penalty constitutes punishment for an offense com-
mitted against the entire community or state, rather than one or more indi-
viduals.2 4 The court utilized a restatement of the Huntington test criteria from
a recent Sixth Circuit decision:
(1) whether the purpose of the statute was to redress individual
wrongs or more general wrongs to the public;
(2) whether the recovery under the statute runs to the harmed
individual or to the public; and
(3) whether the recovery authorized by the statute is wholly
disproportionate to the harm suffered.22
As to factor (1), the court found that the primary purpose of section 209,
which sought both to "remedy harm to the individual" and promote the
217. 567 F.2d at 990-92 (court noting that California also provided three-year limitation for
action based upon statute "other than for a penalty or a forfeiture").
218. 567 F.2d at 991.
219. Id. See also Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957).
220. 567 F.2d at 991 n.15. The TECA subsequently drew a similar contrast between the treble
damages remedy of section 210 of the ESA, which it implied was penal, and section 211, which
authorized administrative remedies. BuIzan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 620 F.2d 278 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1980). Accord Payne 22, Inc. v. United States, 762 F.2d 91, 93 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985). Contra Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1944). See also Brooklyn Bank
v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
221. 499 F. Supp. 871, 886 (S.D. Ala. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom., Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering, Inc. v. Edwards, 669 F.2d 717 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
877 (1982).
222. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
223. Id. at 668-69, quoted in 499 F. Supp. at 887.
224. Compare Porter v. Montgomery, 163 F.2d 211, 215 (3d Cir. 1947) (a civil action is for
damages if brought for purpose of individual compensation and characterized as penal if it seeks
to obtain a sum of money for the state).
225. In re Wood, No. 79-1504, slip op. at 8758 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 1980) (quoting Murphy v.
Household Finance Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977)). For a somewhat different listing
of "the tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory
in character," see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169-71 (1963).
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general welfare, is not penal. 226 The third factor "likewise indicates that the
restitution ordered herein is not penal. The amount of restitution is equal to
the amount of the illegally obtained profits, and is not at all disproportionate
to the harm suffered."m' 7 The second factor, the court conceded, weighed in
favor of characterization as a penalty. Still, the court endorsed the Fifth
Circuit's suggestion that Huntington needed to be updated to put it in touch
with the realities of modem business practices and a complex economy M
Because the court found that it was impossible to identify and make whole
the precise victims of Citronelle-Mobile's overcharges, and "permitting the
retention of the illegal overcharges would utterly frustrate the purposes of the
EPAA,"-' 9 the court concluded that restitution to the government was not a
penalty under the three-part test.
In another case, plaintiffs challenging a DOE Remedial Order to make
restitution of price control overcharges argued that any such refund to the
United States or the DOE would constitute a civil fine beyond the DOE's
authority to exact. 2 0 In upholding the Remedial Order, the court summarily
rejected this argument: "It appears that controlling authority exists contrary
to the contentions of plaintiff and such contentions are therefore found to be
without merit, as a matter of law." 23
The TECA in recent cases has reaffirmed the principle that restitution by
way of disgorgement of overcharge funds to the DOE is not a penalty.
Defendants in United States v. Sutton 2 argued, on appeal, that the trial
court's order that they make restitution of $423 million in illegal overcharges
constituted a penalty barred by the statute of limitations. In affirming the
restitution award, the TECA held that "[a]n award of restitution is an equitable
remedy, and not a penalty."12 3 In United States v. Ladd Petroleum Corp.,2
The TECA upheld an award of prejudgment interest as part of a restitution
award on the following basis:
To the extent defendant has had the free use of the income-
producing ability of plaintiff's money without having to pay for
it, he has been unjustly enriched. To divest him of this unjustified
226. 499 F. Supp. at 887.
227. Id. (emphasis supplied).
228. Id. (quoting In re Wood, No. 79-1504, slip op. at 8758 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 1980)).
229. 499 F. Supp. at 888. The TECA affirmed this decision as modified, holding that while
restitution funds could be paid to the government and held by it temporarily, the government had
"a duty to try to ascertain those overcharged, and refund them [sic], with interest, from the
restitution funds." 669 F.2d at 723.
230. Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co. v. DOE, 4 Energy Mgmt. (CCH) 26,400 (W.D. Okla. Aug.
30, 1982).
231. Id. at 28,966 (citing Bonray Oil Co. v. DOE, 472 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Okla. 1978));
Bulzan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 620 F.2d 278 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1980); Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering, Inc. v. O'Leary, 499 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Ala. 1980), aff'd as modified sub. nom.
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Edwards, 669 F.2d 717 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982).
232. 795 F.2d 1040 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986).
233. Id. at 1061.
234. 843 F.2d 506 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1988).
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benefit is not to penalize him, for it has been determined by the
trial that it was never rightfully his.?5
Thus, it is settled TECA law that an award of restitution to the DOE does
not constitute a penalty.
Does the DOE's Claim Against WTM
Fit the General Legal Definition of a "Penalty"?
The question whether a claim constitutes a "penalty" is not limited to
energy cases. A wide range of federal statutes prescribes special treatment for
"penalties. ' ' 26 The meaning of such a term certainly can vary depending on
its context and cannot be mechanically transferred from one legal context to
another .2 7 Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code invites
reference to general nonbankruptcy law,2s which can shed considerable light
on the meaning of "penalty" in section 726(a)(4).
One salient context in which the penalty issue arises is taxation. The question
is whether certain payments are tax-deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses or rather are nondeductible penalties. It would make no
sense to permit a tax deduction for penalties because this would "reduc[e] the
sting of the penalty prescribed by the ... legislature."239 In Jerry Rossman
Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,m Judge Learned Hand, joined
by Judges Charles Clark and Jerome Frank, held that a manufacturer's
payment to the United States Treasury of overcharges to the manufacturer's
customers was not a nondeductible penalty. Rossman inadvertently violated
price ceilings set by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Because it was
difficult to predict the extent to which goods Rossman dyed would shrink or
stretch, Rossman accepted its finishers' shrinkage estimates, which proved
235. Id. at 509 (quoting Feather v. United Mine Workers of America, 711 F.2d 530, 540 (3d
Cir. 1983)). See also United States v. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d 1240, 1279 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986), reh. denied, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986); Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 28 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987).
236. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e) to (e)-17 (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1978) (barring discharge in bankruptcy
liquidation of any debt "to the extent that such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss"); 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (conferring exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts of any
action to recover "any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any
Act of Congress"); 19 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(3) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to refund
duties or other receipts when "money has been deposited in the Treasury on account of a
fine, penalty, or forfeiture which did not accrue, or which is finally determined to have accrued
in an amount less than that deposited, or which is mitigated to an amount less than that so
deposited or is remitted"); 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (providing that an action to enforce "any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise" must be brought within five years of the
claim's accrual).
237. See supra note 206.
238. See supra note 132.
239. Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 356 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1958), quoted
in McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States, 300 F.2d 453, 455 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
240. 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
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inaccurate. The inaccuracy resulted in overcharges to Rossman's more than
200 customers. The customers, however, had passed the overcharges to con-
sumers, so refunds to Rossman's customers would not correct the effects of
the overcharges. Desiring to comply with price control regulations, Rossman
consulted the Office of Price Administration, and it was agreed that Rossman
would pay the gross overcharge to the United States Treasury.
Rossman subsequently claimed a tax deduction for "ordinary and necessary
business expenses" based on this refund. The Tax Court denied the deduction
on the grounds it was a penalty. The Second Circuit reversed:
First, it seems apparent to us that the payment of the overcharge
- which is all that is here involved - can on no theory be treated
as the payment of a "penalty." Taken in its broadest sense that
word has a punitive, as opposed to a remedial, meaning; it covers
fines and other exactions which are not restitution for a wrong,
and are only justified, either as a deterrent, or in order to satisfy
an atavistic craving for retaliation. A seller's duty to return the
overcharge to the "terminal buyer": that is, to one "who buys
... for use, or consumption other than in the course of trade or
business," is so clearly not a "penalty" under this definition that
no argument can make it plainer than its bare statement.241
By implication, the court acknowledged that Rossman's payment to the Treas-
ury was "restitution." 242 The court further stated that "if the payment was
only restitutionary, it could not be a penalty in any event. ' 243 Consequently,
the Rossman Corporation was allowed the tax deduction.
4
The Rossman decision provides particularly strong support for the DOE's
claim that it was not seeking a penalty in WTM. In both instances, a
government agency sought disgorgement of illegal profits resulting from over-
charges in violation of price control laws. In Rossman, the violator's payment
of overcharges to the federal Treasury, which of course had not sustained
pecuniary loss from the overcharges, was held not to be a "penalty." By the
same token, the DOE's attempt to force disgorgement of WTM's overcharges
was properly held not to be a "penalty." The argument against a penalty is
even stronger in WTM because payment to the government in Rossman was
made without direct statutory authorization. In contrast, the DOE's proceeding
against WTM was an exercise of its explicit authority under section 209 of
the ESA to seek "restitution" of overcharges.
Case law in the securities area also supports the proposition that disgorge-
ment of unjust enrichment does not constitute a penalty. In Securities and
241. Id. at 712. Accord McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States, 300 F.2d 453, 455-56 (Ct.
Cl. 1962) (Retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Reed, sitting by designation).
242. Jerry Rossman Corp., 175 F.2d at 712.
243. Id. at 714.
244. Id. Accord National Brass Works, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 182 F.2d 526,
530 (9th Cir. 1950); Hershey Creamery Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 877 (Ct. Cl. 1952);
Farmers Creamery Co. of Fredericksburg, Va. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 14 T.C. 879
(1950).
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Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,241 defendants issued a
misleading press release about a discovery of rich ore deposits by Texas Gulf
Sulphur. The defendants were found guilty of insider trading in violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5 promul-
gated thereunder. Several defendants, who were ordered to disgorge profits
made from subsequent trading of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock, contended that
such payments constituted penalties. Such penalties, the defendants argued,
could be imposed only upon conviction of a criminal violation under section
32, and could not be sought by the Commission in a civil action for injunctive
relief under section 21(e) of the Act. The Second Circuit rejected this claim:
Appellants, of course, contended that the required restitution is
indeed a penalty assessment .... This contention overlooks the
realities of the situation. In our prior opinion we found that these
appellants had violated the Act by their purchases of TGS stock
before there had been a public disclosure of the ore discovery.
Restitution of the profits on these transactions merely deprives the
appellants of the gains of their wrongful conduct .... It would
severely defeat the purposes of the Act if a violator of Rule lOb-
5 were allowed to retain the profits from his violation ...
Finally, appellants contend that the order is punitive because it
contains no element of compensation to those who have been
damaged. However, .. . a corporate enterprise may well suffer
harm "when officers and directors abuse their position to obtain
personal profits" since "the effect may be to cast a cloud on the
corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and undermine
public regard for the corporation's securities. .. ."
We conclude that the requirement of restitution in this case was
a proper exercise by the trial judge of the district court's equity
powers.247
In a similar case involving a violation of rule lOb-5 for failing to disclose
material information, the Fifth Circuit also upheld the disgorgement of profits
ordered by the trial court:
The trial court acted properly within its equitable powers in ordering
Pullman to disgorge the profits that he obtained by fraud. The
restitution merely forces the defendant to give up to the trustee the
amount by which he was unjustly enriched .... The purpose of
disgorgement is not to compensate the victims of the fraud, but to
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain...
Disgorgement is remedial and not punitive. The court's power
to order disgorgement extends only to the amount with interest by
245. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972).
246. Id. at 1307 n.8.
247. 446 F.2d at 1308 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). Accord S.E.C. v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1978).
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which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing. Any further
sum would constitute a penalty assessment.
24
8
In the context of the Truth in Lending Act,2 9 the penalty question has
arisen regarding whether an action for damages brought by a debtor against
a lending company passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. Two courts have held
that it does, rejecting the argument that it is a penalty which is not transfer-
able. 0 Another court, also rejecting the claim that such an action was for a
penalty, held that it did not abate upon the death of the plaintiff, as a penalty
would. 21'
Thus, actions for disgorgement of illegal profits for violation of price control
statutes and antitrust laws have uniformly been deemed not to constitute
actions for penalties, regardless of whether the disgorged profits are kept by
the government or returned to the injured party. The holdings of general
"penalty" cases, which are consistent with the holding of the bankruptcy and
energy cases discussed above, provide further support for the DOE's position
that its claims in bankruptcy cases for "restitution" based on price control
overcharges do not constitute penalty claims which should be subordinated
pursuant to section 726(a)(4).
Conclusion
The language and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as bankruptcy,
energy and "penalty" case law, all confirm the correctness of the TECA's
decision in DOE v. WTM that the DOE's claim in bankruptcy for repayment
of the debtor's price control overcharges constituted a general unsecured claim
under section 726(a)(2) rather than a "penalty" covered by section 726(a)(4).
The proceeds of WTM's overcharges were never rightfully part of the debtor's
estate, nor did the debtor's creditors have any right to them either at law or
in equity.
Whatever posterity's judgment may be on the wisdom of the Mandatory
Petroleum Price and Allocation Regulations, the regulations were issued pur-
suant to an unambiguous statutory mandate in the ESA and EPAA. Those
statutes, which were the law of the land during the period when the overcharges
occurred, declared that price controls were in the public interest. Vindication
of that public interest demands restitution of illegal profits, even if they have
passed into the estate of a debtor.
This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the effects of the illegal
overcharges were diffuse and widespread, and the victims thereof are largely
anonymous and unaware of the fact or the extent of their economic injury.
It would be anomalous if the public interest in restitution, and the public
interest in enforcement of the laws which restitution serves, were sacrificed to
248. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
249. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677.
250. Murphy v. Household Finance Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 210-11 (6th Cir. 1977). Accord In
re Wood, 643 F.2d 188, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1980).
251. James v. Home Construction Co. of Mobile, Inc., 621 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1980).
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such factors. It would be similarly anomalous if the DOE, the agency under
a statutory mandate to enforce the regulations and the only body capable of
furthering the public interest in restitution, were disqualified from its enforce-
ment role merely because it had not suffered pecuniary loss. The DOE properly
sought restitution in WTM. Such restitution was not a penalty subject to
subordination, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should reach the same
result in DOE v. Seneca Oil Co.252 if it determines it has jurisdiction to decide
the case.
252. See supra note 16.
[Vol. 42
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss3/2
